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Abstract 
The Web service technology allows the dynamic composition of a workflow (or a business 
flow) by composing a set of existing Web services scattered across the Internet. While a 
given Web service may have multiple service instances taking part in several workflows 
simultaneously, a workflow often involves a set of service instances that belong to different 
Web services. In order to establish trust relationships amongst service instances, new security 
protocols are urgently needed. 
Hada and Maruyama [HAD02] presented a session-oriented, multi-party authentication 
protocol to resolve this problem. Within a session the protocol provides a common session 
secret shared by all the service instances, thereby distinguishing the instances from those of 
other sessions. However, individual instances cannot be distinguished and identified by the 
session secret. This leads to vulnerable session management and poor threat containment. 
In this thesis, we present a new design for a multi-party authentication protocol. In this 
protocol, each service instance is provided with a unique identifier. The Diffie-Hellman Key 
Agreement scheme is employed to generate the trust relationship between service instances 
within the same flow. The Coordinated Atomic Action scheme is exploited for achieving an 
improved level of threat containment. 
The new protocol was implemented in Java and evaluated by a combined use of experiments 
and model-based analysis. The results show that the time consumption for multi-party 
authentication increases linearly as the number of service instances that are introduced into a 
session increases. Our solution is therefore potentially applicable for Web service flow with a 
large number of participants. Various public key algorithms are also compared and evaluated 
during the experiments in order to select the most suitable one for our new protocol. 
Key words: Atomic actions, authentication, fault tolerance, Internet computing, key 
exchange, security, Web services 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Web services are self-contained, self-describing, modular applications that can be published, 
located and invoked across the Web [VASOl]. Although this new technology was only 
proposed several years ago, it has already created great interest within the Computer Science 
community. The emergence of Web services is promoting the development of dynamic e-
businesses such as virtual-corporation [BER02] and E-market [Y AN02]. Through the use of 
protocols such as XML, SOAP, WSDL and UDDI, Web services can contact each other 
dynamically over the Internet and enable users to build flexible business solutions. 
Web services provide options for both suppliers and users. Web service suppliers can 
dynamically cooperate with other suppliers to compose and provide larger Web services, 
while users can select their desired Web services scattered across the network and organize 
them together to accomplish their goals. For instance, a travel agency service may need to 
contact both an airline service and a hotel service in order to book a client's holiday. 
Understandably, the combination of Web services can be very complex in many cases. Thus, 
a simple but structured means is required to describe such combinations of services. At the 
moment, there are some specific languages, e.g., WSFL [LEYOl] and XLANG [THAOl], 
proposed for describing workflows (Web service combinations). We use the term worliflow to 
describe a business process that is automatically executed and managed by computer systems. 
There exists also some work on Web services flow control (e.g., [KIMOO, YAN02]). However 
it is the behavior of multiple parties participating in a workflow that introduces new security 
challenges. 
1.2 The Problem 
Essentially, a session is a lasting interaction between system entities, often involving a user, 
typified by the maintenance of some state of the interaction for the duration of the interaction 
[HOD02]. In the traditional Client/Server model, a session generally only consists of two 
partners (client and sever). In the peer-to-peer model of Web_~ervices, the conditions are quite 
different. :~~~~cF~ 
1 
\ ,~,, \ t; 
-~ 
A Web service is a static, long-lived entity with a unique identifier all over the world (e.g., its 
URL address). When a Web service receives an initial request to participate in a business flow 
(called a session), it will invoke a new instance to handle the requests that are pertinent to this 
particular business flow [HAD02]. However, a Web service instance is a dynamic, transient 
entity usually without a unique identifier. This is because a business flow may involve 
multiple instances that belong to different systems and organizations, while a Web service 
may have multiple instances that take part in different workflows simultaneously. So an 
authentication mechanism is needed to make sure that an instance in one Web service 
business flow is communicating with other instances that take part in the same business flow. 
The authors of [HAD02] present an initial session authentication protocol for establishing a 
trust relationship between instances of a business flow. But as the authors have stated in their 
work, there are several related issues in the area of Web service session control that are as yet 
unresolved, such as when and how to end a session. At the moment, this field has not been 
fully explored. 
1.3 Main Results 
This research is concentrated on the analysis of the issues regarding session control of Web 
services, as well as exploring different ways to design and develop a multiparty session 
authentication system for Web services. Models for different solutions are generated 
respectively to evaluate their performances. In the final solution, a trusted third party session 
authority is leveraged to manage the session, and each instance in a session is associated with 
a unique identifier. Furthermore, a session management protocol is designed and a CA 
(Coordinated Atomic) action mechanism is employed to enhance its ability of attack 
confinement. 
In order to examine our idea in practice, a proto-type of the Instance ID authority system is 
implemented in Java. Various asymmetric algorithms are employed in the experiment system 
in order to compare their performances. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 introduces an overview of the research. 
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Chapter 2 gives an overview of Web service architecture and related security issues. First of 
all, the Web service model and related specifications are introduced. After the introduction, a 
discussion of the new security challenges that Web services must face is provided. Among 
these challenges, the security requirements for session authentication are particularly 
important. This new issue is related to strong flow ability of Web services. After discussing 
the limitation of existing solutions in session management and related fields, we conclude that 
a new session security management scheme for Web services is needed. 
Chapter 3 introduces the structure of our new session authentication system. The chapter 
describes the solution in [HAD02] and its drawbacks followed with the introduction of the 
session authority and the CAA (CA action) manager. 
Chapter 4 contains the results and analysis of the experiment performed as well as the 
analysis of the model of the system. The results of the experiment will then be compared with 
those generated by the model. Also, we present another decentralised plan of multi-party 
authentication system for Web services, which was considered when we designed our 
protocol. This plan does not rely on any trusted third party. Using formal analysis, we 
compare this solution with the centralised system described in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 5 gives the conclusion and discusses future work. 
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Since the introduction of Web services several years ago, the IT industry has realized that 
Web services enable dynamic and flexible enterprise applications. A corporation can employ 
numerous Web services from different providers, which are implemented with different 
languages, and executed on different platforms to generate a single unified application. 
Though few doubt the potential of Web services, the security issue is currently a major 
obstacle preventing the adoption of this new technology. In this chapter, we will introduce the 
situation surrounding Web service security. 
2. ]_ W elb §e.rvkes 
2.1.1 Service-Oriented Architectmre (SOA) 
In the traditional e-business way, a corporation that wants to accomplish a business goal has 
to buy the related software, normally built as a standard product, from the supplier. Also, 
corporations have to constantly maintain and update the software by themselves. So the way 
that different corporations implement their e-business systems is ad hoc. Furthermore, it is 
notoriously complex, costly, and time-consuming to integrate these heterogeneous business 
information systems. Under the pressures of competition, corporations need a more effective 
and flexible model to reduce their costs and improve their competitiveness. The concept of a 
Service-Oriented Architecture is put forward under this background. A Service-Oriented 
Architecture is essentially a collection of services that communicate with each other through a 
standard means. The communication can involve either simple data passing or multiple 
service coordination. In this model, an application can be wrapped within a well-defined 
interface. In other words, this application is wrapped into a service. This interface hides all the 
details of the application (e.g., language, operation system, database, etc.) The user can access 
this application through the interface without knowing any details about its implementation. 
Service-oriented architectures are not a new thing. Early attempts at SOA such as the 
Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) and Common Object Request Broker 
Architecture (CORBA) led to the realization that the future business logic of an application is 
not necessarily coupled with the present logic [BEQ02]. Corporations can select and change 
their business partners dynamically as well as reduce software maintenance costs. 
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2.L2 Web Services 
According to IBM, Web services are a form of Web applications that are self-contained, self-
describing and modular. These Web applications can be published, located, and invoked 
across the Web. Web services perform functions ranging from simple requests to complicated 
business processes. Once a Web service is deployed, other applications (and other Web 
services) can discover and access it dynamically [TIDOO]. A Web service is described using a 
standard, formal XML notion, called the service description. It includes all the details 
necessary for interacting with the service, including message format (that details the 
operations), transport protocols, and location. The interface hides the implementation details 
of the service, allowing it to be used independently of the hardware and software platform it is 
executed in and the programming language it is implemented in. This allows and encourages 
Web Services-based applications to be loosely coupled, component-oriented, cross-
technology implementations. Web Services can fulfil a specific task or a set of tasks. They 
can be used alone or with other Web Services to carry out a complex aggregation or a 
business transaction [KREOI]. Currently, multiple major software companies have proposed 
their own Web services plans: Microsoft's .Net, Sun's Sun ONE (Sun Open Net 
Environment) and so on. These plans are based on several common technologies: UDDI 
[GIBOl], WSDL [CHROl], SOAP [BOXOO] and XML [COW02]. 
Web service technology is independent of any transporting protocols. Although HTTP is the 
de facto standard network protocol for Internet-available Web Services, other Internet 
protocols such as SMTP and FfP can also be supported. In Intranet domains, different 
reliable messaging and call infrastructures (e.g., MQSeries, CORBA) can also be employed. 
The network technology can be chosen based on various requirements including security, 
availability, performance, reliability and so on. 
2.1.3 Web Service Architecture 
According to [KREOl], there are three main roles in the Web Services architecture: service 
provider, service requestor and service registry. The service provider is the owner of the 
service as well as the platform that hosts access to the service. The service requestor is the 
entity that discovers and invokes required Web services. A service requestor can be a person 
or Web service. Lastly, the Web registry is a searchable registry of service descriptions where 
service providers publish their service descriptions. 
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The interaction between these three roles involves the operations publish, find and bind as 
follows: 
o Publish: To be accessible, a service description needs to be published so 
that a service requestor can find it. Where it is published can vary 
depending on the requirements of the application. 
o Find: In the find operation, the service requestor retrieves a service 
description directly or queries the service registry for the type of the service 
required. 
o Bind: Eventually, every service needs to be invoked. In the bind operation 
the service requestor can invoke a Web service statically (This means the 
service is contacted through the pte-defined code) or initiate an interaction 
with the service dynamically at runtime, that is, uses the binding details in 
the service description to locate, contact, and invoke the service(s). 
Figure 1 shows the overview of the Web Service architecture. 
Figure 1 Web services roles, operations and artefacts [KREO I] 
In the Web service architecture, there are two artefacts: Service and Service description 
(presented as ellipses in Figure 1) [KREO I]. 
o Service: A service is a software module deployed on network accessible 
platforms provided by the service provider. It exists to be invoked by or to 
interact with a service requestor. It can also function as a requestor, using 
other Web Services in its implementation. 
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o Service Description: The service description is a machine-processable 
specification of the Web service's interface [B0003]. It contains the useful 
information such as data types, operations, binding information, network 
location, categorization, and other meta-data which are necessary for 
service requestors to locate and utilize their favourite services. 
2.1.4 Web Services Protocol Stack 
2.1.4.1 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
The Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is a lightweight protocol for the exchange of 
information in a decentralized, distributed environment [BOXOO]. It is an XML based 
protocol and provides a mechanism for exchanging structured and typed information between 
peers . As with the illustration of Figure 2, a SOAP message consists of three parts: 
o Envelope, which is the root element of every SOAP message and marks the 
beginning and the end of a SOAP message. 
o Header, which is an optional element and can be used to describe attributes 
of the message or the operations that should be done to the message (e.g., 
the way that a recipient of a SOAP message should process it). 
o Body, which is required in every SOAP message and provides a simple 
mechanism for exchanging mandatory information intended for the 
ultimate recipient of the message [BOXOO]. 
SOAP Message 
Envelope 
<SOAP-ENV: Envelope> 
Header 
< SOAP-ENV: Header> 
<I SOAP-ENV: Header> 
Body 
< SOAP-ENV: Body> 
<J SOAP-ENV: Body> 
<J SOAP-ENV: Envelope> 
Figure 2 Anatomy of SOAP messages [BEQ02] 
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Figure 3 and Figure 4 present a simple conversation between a requestor and a Web service 
HelloWorld. Firstly, the requestor sends a message to HelloWorld. The SOAP message of 
this request is described in Figure 3. This message implements a RPC call to the sayHello( ) 
method of the Web service, and the parameter of this method is a string "Dacheng". 
<?xml version="I.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www. w3 .org/200 1/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi= "http://www. w3 .org/200 1/XMLSchema-
instance"> 
<soapenv:Body> 
<ns I: say Hello soapenv: encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:nsl="urn:helloworld"> 
<argO xsi:type="xsd:string">Dacheng</argO> 
<Ins I :say Hello> 
<lsoapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
Figure 3 Example of SOAP messages (1) 
The message presented in Figure 4 is the response from the Web service to the requestor. The 
<sa yHe 11 oRet urn> element includes the replied string, "Hello Dacheng !" 
<?xml version="I.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www. w3 .org/200 1/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi= "http://www. w3 .org/200 1/XMLSchema-
instance"> 
<soapenv:Body> 
<nsl :sayHelloResponse soapenv:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encodingl" 
xmlns:nsl="urn:helloworld"> 
<sayHelloRetum xsi:type="xsd:string">Hello Dacheng!</sayHelloRetum> 
<Ins! :sayHelloResponse> 
<lsoapenv:Body> 
<lsoapenv :Envelope> 
Figure 4 Example of SOAP messages (2) 
2.1.4.2 Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 
WSDL is an XML format for describing network services as a set of endpoints operating on 
messages containing either document-oriented or procedure-oriented information [CHROI]. 
The latest version of the WSDL specification was developed by Web Services Description 
Working Group and was submitted to W3C as a suggestion in March 2001 [CER02]. As 
Figure 5 illustrates, WSDL specifies a series of elements [CHROl]: 
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Wh at Data T ypes? 
<message/> <ponType/> 
What Do you Do? 
<binding!> <operation/> 
Interface Definiti on 
<service/> <ponl> 
Where? 
Interface Implementation 
Figure 5 Structure of WSDL [BEQ02] 
o Port, which specifies the Web service's endpoint by combining a binding 
and a network address. 
o Port Type, which is an abstract set of operations supported by one or more 
endpoints. 
o Oper a ti on, which is an abstract description of an action supported by the 
service. This element defines the name of the function and input/output 
types. 
o Me s sage , which is an abstract, typed definition of the data being 
communicated. 
o Type s , which is a container for data type definitions usmg some type 
system such as XSD. 
o Bindi n g , which is used to attach a specific protocol, data format or 
structure to an abstract message, operation, or endpoint. It describes how to 
transmit the operations defined in a <Port Type > element over the 
network. 
o Serv i ce , which is a collection of related endpoints and specifies where to 
find the Web service. 
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2.1.4.3 Universal Description Discovery and Integration (UDDI) 
Universal Description Discovery and Integration (UDDI) is a technical specification for 
describing, discovering, and integrating Web services [CER02]. UDDI enables business 
organizations to quickly and dynamically publish and discover Web services. It is a critical 
part of the Web service protocol stack. 
Microsoft, IBM, and Ariba announced the first version of UDDI: UDDI 1.0 in September 
2000. Since the initial announcement, there are more than 280 companies taking part in the 
UDDI initiative. 
Generally, the UDDI technical architecture consists of three parts [CER02]: 
o UDDI data model, which is an XML schema for describing Web services. 
o UDDI API, which is a SOAP-based API for searching and publishing 
UDDI date. 
o UDDI cloud services, which are the operation sites that provide 
implementations of the UDDI specification and synchronize all data on a 
scheduled basis. 
So the UDDI project not only provides a technical specification for building a distributed 
directory of business and Web services, but also serves as a fully operational implementation 
of this specification. 
As described above, UDDI provides a schema to describe Web services and businesses. We 
can divide the information captured within UDDI into three main categories [CER02]: 
o White pages, which describe business information (e.g., business name, 
business description, contact information). 
o Yellow pages, which describe the general services information of the 
business. Yellow pages may include information on industry, product, etc. 
based on standard taxonomies. 
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o Green pages, which describe the technical information of the services. It is 
notable that UDDI is not only restricted to describing Web services based 
on SOAP, but can also describe other kinds of service (e.g., CORBA, Java 
RMI services). 
2.1.5 Web Services versus Previous §OA Attempts 
Before the occurrence of Web services, there have been three major SOA attempts (J2EE, 
CORBA and DCOM). Compared with these attempts, Web service has the following 
advantages [T0003]: 
o Web service provides a universal standard, WSDL, to describe the service. 
No mater how the services were implemented, the user can access them 
with WSDL. Before Web services, there were no universal standards used 
for SOA. Different attempts came with their own standards. DCOM uses 
Microsoft-IDL, CORBA uses CORBA-IDL, and J2EE uses Java. 
Moreover, these standards are incompatible. This increases the difficulty of 
user integration. 
D Web service separates interfacing from programming. Before a developer 
programs with J2EE, DCOM, or CORBA, he has to learn their 
programming model and API sets respectively. On the contrary, a Web 
service-oriented architecture does not define the way in which the interface 
is implemented. Thus, there is no need to learn any particular API when 
Web services integration is supported. 
2.2 Web Service Security Challenges 
Practically, Web services are loosely coupled, language-neutral, platform independent. And it 
is well known that Web services have many advantages such as easy enterprise application 
integration, distributed development, and Business-to-Business e-business implementation. 
However, Web services also bring many great security risks, which have become the most 
critical issues that must be addressed before Web services are widely employed in e-business 
applications. In this section, we discuss some typical risks in this field. 
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2.2.1 Malicious Attacks 
In order to generate a secure environment for Web services, developers have to counter many 
potential attacks. Generally, there are two main kinds of attacks. One kind of attack utilizes 
the loopholes and bugs of software to circumvent the access control of the system or force the 
system to do something improper. Buffer overrun attack [GHOOl] and timing attack 
[RA YOO] are representative of this kind of attack. 
The other kind of attack compromises the security of the systems by leveraging the 
algorithms' drawbacks or the security protocols' logic flaws. This kind of attack can be 
further divided into two categories: passive attacks and active attacks. Passive attacks, also 
known as eavesdropping attacks, are the simplest way to attack the security system. In this 
type of attack, adversaries extract useful information from the private conversations of honest 
entities by eavesdropping on their communication and then snatching the messages that are 
transported through the network. Eavesdropping attacks are normally used for gathering 
information for future active attacks. Since the eavesdroppers only monitor the conversations 
of other entities, it is difficult for the partners of the communications to detect the attack and 
act accordingly. In comparison with previous Web applications, Web services seem to be 
more vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. Since Web services transmit XML documents in 
which data are well structured and easily understood, it is much easier to retrieve information 
from these documents than from binary data. 
In contrast to passtve attacks, active attacks compromise the security of systems by 
additionally subverting the communications in many ways (i.e., injecting messages, 
intercepting messages, replaying messages, altering messages) [BLA97]. We review four 
common active attacks: dictionary attack, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and 
number theoretic attacks. In addition, we will discuss the potential threat of these attacks to 
Web services. 
I. Dictionary attack is also called guessing attack. In some security systems, users choose 
the secrets (i.e. password) for authentication. Such secrets are sometimes selected from a 
relatively small domain of secrets. We call this type of secrets poorly chosen secrets or 
weakly shared secrets. With the use of a 'dictionary', an attacker can perform the attack 
through iterative guessing and verification. Some experiments have proved that this type 
of attack is surprisingly effective in compromising particular security systems [GON93, 
WU99]. These attacks can be subdivided into two classes: 
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o Off-line guessing attacks: An adversary eavesdrops on protocol messages 
and stores them locally for verification. There is no need for a server to 
participate in verification, so it is nearly impossible to notice these attacks 
[KW097]. 
o On-line guessing attacks: An adversary attempts to use a guessed password 
iteratively on-line. The attack is performed by replaying eavesdropped 
messages or impersonating other clients. Unless a protocol provides the 
security server with sufficient information to detect authentication failures, 
the server cannot notice the attack [KW097]. 
In Web service environment, Web services generally combine together to form a single 
application. These Web services may be under the management of different security 
systems. Thus, a Web service may have to cooperate with partners whose host security 
systems use password that are vulnerable to dictionary attacks. So, the security of other 
Web services will be threatened even if there is only one Web service whose host security 
system is vulnerable to dictionary attack. 
2. In most cases, attackers cannot get valuable information directly through eavesdropping 
on the conversations protected by a security protocol over the network. Sometimes, 
however, they can replay these messages later to get useful responds for other attacks or 
impersonate a logical entity accessing security resources. We call this kind of attack as 
replay attack. 
According to different employments of the antique messages, there are two types of 
replay attacks: 
o Run external attacks: Attackers get messages from one protocol run and 
replay them in another. The Denning-Sacco attack on the original 
Needham-Schroeder key distribution protocol is a classic example of this 
type of attack [SYV94, DEN81]. 
o Run internal attacks: Attackers get messages and replay them within the 
current protocol run. An example of this type of attack is described in 
[DEN81]. 
As we stated, Web services transmit messages in XML documents, and the data in XML 
document are in well-defined structure. So it is much easier for an adversary to pick up 
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useful information from XML documents intercepted from Internet and re-organize them 
to implement replay attacks. 
3. Man-in-the-middle attack compromises the security of the systems by placing a computer 
or another device in the middle of the communication chain to steal passwords, keys, or 
eavesdrop on communications [BR002]. In this attack, the adversary intercepts some 
messages of a conversation between two entities and replaces them with his carefully 
designed messages [ABA97]. After these processes, the adversary generates the 
communication channel with two entities, and these entities communicate with the 
adversary respectively. Hence, the adversary can monitor and modify the messages 
transmitted between the victims. 
Web services work in the peer-to-peer environment. In many cases, the messages sent 
from a Web service have to traverse through multiple Web services and may be modified 
as required before it reaches its ultimate destination. Consequently, it is more difficult to 
verify whether the message obtained is the original one. 
4. Number theoretic attack compromises the security of the systems which make use of the 
improper parameters [PAT97]. Unlike the attacks we mentioned above, which attempt to 
find and make use of the logic drawbacks of the security protocol, number theoretic 
attacks employ the knowledge of number theory to narrow the domain of the secret key 
of the security system and make it easier to guess the secret key. In order to prevent this 
kind of attack, the designer of the security protocol must be familiar with the features of 
the security algorithms so that they can select the proper parameters. 
When we discussed the potential threat of dictionary attack above, we mentioned that the 
security of the integrated Web service application would be compromised even if there 
were only one participant that is vulnerable to the dictionary attack. For the same reason, 
the Web services may sometimes suffer from the number theoretic attacks when their 
participants use improper parameters for their security systems. 
Essentially, due to the structure of Web services, Web services have to expose their details to 
the open network so that both potential users and malicious attackers can get useful 
information easily. In addition, Web services are generally developed to achieve complex 
functions. The interface of a Web service may be composed of a number of methods and can 
be much more complex than previous Web applications. So it is much easier for adversaries 
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to find drawbacks from the interfaces and employ them to compromise the security of the 
application. 
In short, the threat of malicious attacks to Web services is much more serious than those to 
previous Web applications. Much research is under way in this field. Due to their efforts, 
some new security protocols have been proposed. We will introduce some of them in later 
sections. 
2.2.2 Firewalls 
Web services break the boundary of organizations. In order to simplify the communication 
among Web services provided by different vendors, Web services normally use port 80 and 
port 443 to transport messages. The standard perimeter firewall will regard these messages as 
standard Web traffic and let them pass unexamined - potentially passing malicious threads. 
Moreover, Web services send their requests and data in standard XML format. Firewalls can 
do a good job of port monitoring and recognizing brute force malicious attack but are not able 
to view the content of these messages in order to detect and then prevent more sophisticated 
security compromises [Y AN02 (1)]. 
2.2.3 Message-Level Security 
Web service technology provides an effective way to realize B2B model. Different from 
traditional B2C model, B2B business processes are more complex, and sometimes it may be 
necessary for SOAP messages to traverse multiple hops before they get to the intended 
destination. Traditionally, people employ transport layer security protocols (e.g., Secure 
HTTP (HTTPS), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS)) to protect 
the integrity and confidentiality of the information [GAR97]. These transport layer protocols 
can only provide encryption and authentication between a pair of endpoints. Therefore, when 
people try to use these protocols to transport SOAP messages between Web services, message 
security may be compromised at the intermediate points. Thus, it is necessary to develop a set 
of message-level security protocols for Web services. 
2.2.4 Exception Handling 
Web services can cooperate together to achieve a business goal. The combination of Web 
services may involve some form of control flows that reflects causal relationships between the 
invoked services [NAK02 (1)]. Sometimes this kind of service flows consists of large amount 
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of Web services and the relationship among the partners can be very complex. Since the Web 
services involved within a service flow is normally provided by different vendors and 
administrated by different organizations, how to handle the exceptions or errors occurred 
during the process of the service flow is a big issue. For instance, some services within a 
service flow may work incorrectly due to internal reasons, and some services may not be able 
to continue their work due to network errors or malicious attacks. Moreover, before the 
exceptions or attacks are noticed by other Web services within the flow, more Web services 
may have already been invoked. Consequently, how to synchronize the Web services and roll 
back the flow to a trusted state is an interesting topic. 
Besides the issues we have described above, there are still many interesting subjects in this 
field, such as how to generate communication between two organizations using different 
security systems, how to work with an outside vendor that is insecure, how to Web-enable a 
legacy application that was never designed to be exposed to the public Internet, and so on. 
Since there are so many security issues associated with Web services, developing new 
security protocols for Web services is necessary and urgent. 
To generate a secure environment for Web services, several basic requirements must be first 
addressed. We describe them as follows [NAK02]: 
o Confidentiality guarantees that the exchanged information is protected 
against eavesdroppers. 
o Authentication guarantees that the access to e-business applications and 
data is restricted to only those who can provide the appropriate proof of 
identity. 
o Integrity refers to assurance that the message was not modified accidentally 
or deliberately in transit. 
o Non-repudiation guarantees that the sender of the message cannot deny 
having sent it. 
o Authorization is the process to decide whether or not the entity can access 
the particular resource. 
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In the following section, several current Web service security protocols are discussed in detail, 
highlighting the implementation relationship between the main requirements mentioned above 
and the protocols listed below. 
2.3 XML Security Specifications 
In this section we will introduce several security specifications to meet different XML 
security aspects. These include: 
o XML Digital Signature, which describes a means to generate and represent 
digital signatures in XML. 
D XML Encryption, which specifies a means of encrypting data and 
presenting it in XML format. 
o Web Services Security, which expends SOAP specification to enable 
message integrity, message confidentiality, and single message 
authentication. 
D XML Key Management Specification, which integrates PKI with Web 
service technology and specifies protocols for distributing and registering 
public keys. 
2.3.1 Canonical XML 
Before we delve into the details of XML signature and XML encryption, we will first 
introduce Canonical XML. If people leverage some kinds of security algorithms (e.g., 
Encryption algorithms, MAC algorithms, digital signature algorithms) to provide the 
confidence of the integrity of a message, the slightest change to that message will result in 
totally different values. It is fine to apply this feature of the security algorithms used to protect 
the integrity of messages for normal use. But in the case of XML, the condition is a little more 
complex. 
In the context of XML documents, two documents in different textual representations may 
still have the same content. Obviously, the syntax variants that do not cause any logical 
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change do not imply that the integrity of the XML document or the authentication of its 
sender is suspicious. 
Canonical XML specification describes a method for generating a physical representation, the 
canonical form, of an XML document that accounts for the permissible changes [BOYOI]. In 
both XML encryption and signature specifications, security functions work on the canonical 
form directly. Therefore, the results are the same on two logically identical documents, even 
though their physical structures may be different. 
2.3.2 XML §ignunture 
XML signature specifies XML syntax and processing rules for creating and presenting digital 
signatures [BAROI]. The digital signature of a message can help the receiver ascertain the 
identity of the originator. Furthermore, Digital signatures can guarantee the non-repudiation 
and freshness of the messages. 
XML signature can be applied to both binary data and octet data. It also provides various 
ways to represent the signatures. The signature can be a part of the XML document or 
detached from the data that is signed. 
The XML signature specification makes use of the <Signature> element, which has the 
following structure, to represent signatures in XML format [BEQ02]. 
<Signature ID> 
<Signedinfo> 
<CanonicalizationMethod/> 
<SignatureMethod/> 
<Reference URI > 
<Transforms/> 
<DigestMethod/> 
<DigestValue/> 
</Reference> 
</Signedinfo> 
<SignatureValue> 
<Keyinfo> 
<Object ID> 
</Signature> 
Among the elements within the <Signature> element, <CanonicalizationMethod> 
element specifies the canonicalization algorithm used to canonicalize the XML document. 
<SignatureMethod> element identifies the cryptographic functions used to generate the 
signature. <DigestMethod> element defines thedigest algorithm (e.g., HMAC, SHA-1, etc.) 
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to be applied to the signed object. This kind of algorithms Is also called message 
authentication codes (MACs), seals, integrity check values, or message integrity codes 
(MICs). It can ensure of the integrity of the message received. 
The code below present an instance of XML signature [BAROl]. 
<Signature Id="MyFirstSignature" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<Signedinfo> 
<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-
xml-cl4n-20010315"/> 
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-
shal"/> 
<Reference URI="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xhtmll-20000126/"> 
<Transforms> 
<Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-cl4n-
20010315"/> 
</Transforms> 
<DigestMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#shal"/> 
<DigestValue>j6lwx3rvEP00vKtMup4NbeVu8nk=</DigestValue> 
</Reference> 
</Signedinfo> 
<SignatureValue>MCOCFFrVLtRlk= ... </SignatureValue> 
<Key Info> 
<KeyValue> 
<DSAKeyValue> 
<P> ... </P><Q> ... </Q><G> ... </G><Y> ... </Y> 
</DSAKeyValue> 
</KeyValue> 
</Keyinfo> </Signature> 
2.3.3 XML Encryption 
XML encryption is proposed by the W3C XML Encryption Working Group [IMA02]. This 
specification defines the process for encrypting data and representing the result in XML. 
Encryption functions normally serve to improve confidentiality, guaranteeing that the 
exchanged information is protected against eavesdroppers. The encryption of the message 
may also indicate the message's originator [GOL96]. There are two main types of encryption 
algorithms: symmetric encryption algorithms (conventional encryption algorithms) and 
asymmetric algorithms (public-key encryption algorithms). Conventional encryption 
algorithms encipher and decipher the information with the same secret key while public-key 
encryption algorithms use a pair of keys (one for enciphering and one for deciphering). 
The encrypted data may be XML documents, XML elements, XML element contents, or any 
arbitrary data. The encrypted information is enclosed within the <EncryptedData> element. 
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This element will be inserted to the XML document and take place the encrypted content 
[BEQ02]. 
The basic structure of the <EncryptedData> element is presented as follows [IMA02, 
BEQ02]: 
<EncryptedData Id Type MimeType Encoding?> 
<EncryptionMethod/> 
<ds:Keyinfo> 
<EncryptedKey> 
<AgreementMethod> 
<ds:KeyName> 
<ds:RetrievalMethod> 
<ds:*> 
</ds:Keyinfo> 
<CipherData> 
<CipherValue> 
<CipherReference URI?> 
</CipherData> 
<EncryptionProperties> 
</EncryptedData> 
The <Encrypt ionMethod> element indicates the security algorithm applied to encrypt the 
data. The <CipherData> element indicates the encrypted data. And the <EncryptedKey> 
element is used to transport encryption keys from the originator to a recipient. The key value 
is always encrypted to the recipient [IMA02]. 
Following is an example [IMA02] of encrypting an element of a XML document. 
<?xml version='l.O'?> 
<Paymentinfo xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2'> 
<Name>John Smith</Name> 
<CreditCard Limit='5,000' Currency='USD'> 
<Number>4019 2445 0277 5567</Number> 
<Issuer>Example Bank</Issuer> 
<Expiration>04/02</Expiration> 
</CreditCard> 
</Paymentinfo> 
The XML document above illustrates the details of a credit card, which includes card number, 
issuer, expiration data, etc. After encrypting the <Credi tCard> element, the message should 
be as follows: 
<?xml version='l.O'?> 
<Paymentinfo xmlns='http://example.org/paymentv2'> 
<Name>John Smith</Name> 
<EncryptedData Type='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element' 
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xmlns =' http://www . w3 . org/2001/04/xmlenc# ' > 
<CipherData > 
<C ipherValue >A23B45C56</CipherValue > 
</C ipherData> 
</ EncryptedData> 
</Payment Info> 
It is notable that <Cred i tCard> element is taken place by <EncryptedData > element. 
2.3.4 Web Services Security (WS-Security) 
To meet the various aspects of Web service security requirement, ffiM, Microsoft, and 
Verisigin proposed a set of security specifications [BEQ02]. WS-Security specification is one 
of them (see Figure 6). WS-Security describes enhancements to SOAP in providing quality of 
protection through message integrity, message confidentiality, and single message 
authentication. These mechanisms can be used to accommodate a wide variety of security 
models and encryption technologies [ATK02]. 
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Figure 6 Web services security specifications [BEQ02] 
These specifications include [BEQ02]: 
D WS-Policy: describes the capabilities and constraints of the security (and 
other business) policies on intermediaries and end points. 
D WS-Trust: describes a framework for trust models that enables Web 
services to interoperate security. 
D WS-Privacy: will describe a model for how Web services and requesters 
state privacy preferences and organizational privacy practice statements. 
D WS-SecureConversation: describes how to manage and authenticate 
message exchanges between parties including exchanging security context 
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and establishing and deriving session keys. The session mentioned here 
only consists of two partners. 
WS-Federation: describes how to manage and broker the trust relationships 
in a heterogeneous federated environment including support for federated 
identities. 
WS-Authorization: will describe how to manage authorization data and 
authorization policies. 
WS-Security is the foundation to implement the specifications described above. It provides an 
extensible mechanism to associate security tokens such as certificate of X.509 and ticket of 
Kerberos with SOAP messages. Kerberos and X.509 [MEN95] are the most common 
authentication systems and have been employed in many fields for a long time. Also, WS-
Security leverages XML signature and XML encryption to confirm the integrity and 
confidentiality of SOAP messages. 
Overall, WS-Security is a message-level security protocol, and it provides the basic support to 
integrate Web service technology with traditional authentication systems and generate various 
security solutions for Web services. 
2.3.5 XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) 
The WS-Security protocol provides facilities to transport encoded binary security tokens and 
makes the initial effort to integrate traditional authentication systems with Web service 
technology. Furthermore, the XML Key Management specification provides an interface 
between PKI and Web services in order to simplify PKI deployment and achieve seamless-
integration between PKI and Web services. 
XKMS consists of two parts: the XML Key Information Service Specification (X-KISS) and 
the XML Key Registration Service Specification (X-KRSS). X-KISS allows a client to 
delegate part or all of the tasks required to process XML Signature <ds: Key Info> elements 
to an XKMS service, while X-KRSS is a protocol to support the registration of a key pair by a 
key pair holder, with the intent that the key pair subsequently be usable in conjunction with 
the XML Key Information Service Specification or a Public Key Infrastructure [HAL03]. 
One of the advantages of XKMS is that key management functions are achieved with Web 
~"services. XKMS pr.o_vides aPKI trust service and remQves the need.for client support of PKI 
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features, so the complex certificate processing logic is abstracted from the applications and 
becomes a server side component [NAK02]. 
The Web service security protocols that we described above are important in integrating 
traditional cryptographic technologies and authentication systems with Web services. But 
according to our research, we found that in some aspects, these traditional solutions are 
insufficient to fulfil the security requirements of Web services. In this thesis, we discuss a 
new security issue which is related to the strong workflow ability of Web services. In the next 
section, we will provide an overview of this security issue and discuss the limitations of 
traditional solutions in this case. 
2.4 Multi~ Party Authentication for Web Services 
One desirable feature of Web services is their strong workflow ability. However, more work 
is needed to enhance the security of Web service flows. In this section, we will discuss this 
topic. Before we discuss the security issues of Web service flows, we will first take a glance 
at Web services flow language (WSFL), as it is a specification used to describe the complex 
combinations of Web services in XML. 
2.4.1 Web Services Flow Language 
WSFL language, proposed by IDM recently, specifies a set of XML grammars to describe the 
software workflow processes within the framework of Web service architecture. According to 
different aspects of Web services compositions, WSFL provides two types of composition 
models: Flow Models and Global Models [LEYOl]. In the Flow Models, a composition, also 
known as a flow composition, describes how to use the functionality provided by the 
collection of composed Web services. In the Global Models, the composition describes how 
the Web services interact with each other rather than specifying the execution sequence. 
WSFL supports recursive composition, that is, every Web service composition can be 
regarded as a new Web service in a larger composition. 
The schema syntax for the <flowModel> element is provided in the following code sample 
[LEYOI]: 
<complexType name="flowModelType"> 
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<sequence> 
<element name="flowSource" 
type="wsfl:flowSourceType" 
minOccurs="O"/> 
<element name="flowSink" 
type="wsfl:flowSinkType" 
minOccurs="O"/> 
<element name="serviceProvider" 
type="wsfl:serviceProviderType" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<group ref="wsfl:activityFlowGroup"/> 
</sequence> 
<attribute name="name" type="NCName" use="required"/> 
<attribute name="serviceProviderType" type="Qname"/> 
</complexType> 
<group name="activityFlowGroup"> 
<sequence> 
<element name="export" type="wsfl:exportType" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<element name="activity" type="wsfl:activityType" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<element name="controlLink" type="wsfl:controlLinkType" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<element name="dataLink" type="wsfl:dataLinkType" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</sequence> 
</group> 
As with the presentation of the code above, the flow model IS defined using six different 
elements [LEYOl]: 
The <flowSource> and <flowSink> elements define the input and 
output of the flow model. 
The <serviceProvider> elements represent the services participating in 
the composition. 
The <activity> elements represent the usage of individual operations of 
a service provider inside the flow model. 
D The <controlLink> and <dataLink> elements represent control and 
data connections among activities in the model. 
Therefore, the flow model is sufficient in describing the relationship among Web service 
partners within a workflow. In a Web services composition such as the one presented in 
Figure 7, multiple participants collaborate following some policy. These participants normally 
do not contact with each other until it is necessary. Furthermore, these participants provided 
by different vendors, developed in different languages, executed on different platforms, are 
combined dynamically at run time. The ability of flexible and dynamic binding is one of the 
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great advantages of Web services. Nevertheless, it also puts forth new challenges in the form 
of flow security management. Multi-party authentication issue for Web services is the major 
one among them. 
Figure 7 Interaction between multiple Web service instances within a flow [LEYOl] 
2.4.2 Multi-party Authentication for Web Services 
Since neither XML-RPC nor the SOAP specification provides a mechanism to keep the 
session state, how to maintain the Web service session state based on a stateless protocol such 
as HTTP is a problem that Web service developers have to face. In fact, this stateless issue is 
a problem that has intrigued Web application developers for a long time. There have been a 
number of clever means used to get around it (e.g., using HTTP cookies to preserve the state 
of a series of requests, reposting application data with each request). Recently, work has been 
done to use these measures in Web services and some progresses have been achieved in this 
area. For instance, ASP.NET provides a System. Web. SessionState. 
HttpSessionState class; the Apache implementation of SOAP (i.e., ApacheSOAP) in 
combination with Java and a suitable application service (e.g., Apache Tomcat Server) can 
use cookies to help every user find corresponding service instance. However, these measures 
are not designed generally for managing session state in Web service applications, but rather 
specifically for managing the session state in the applications following their specification 
(e.g., ASP.NET applications). The worst part is that using them ties you to the HTTP 
protocol. The SOAP protocol is designed to work independently of the transport protocols. So 
tying your application to HTTP obviously limits your flexibility and may create additional 
work if you want to provide Web services over any other transport protocol other than HTTP 
(e.g., SMTP). Another drawback of these solutions is that they don not provide any 
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encryption protect to the session IDs. These IDs are transported over Internet in plaintext or 
inserted into the URL address directly. Therefore, the system needs additional measures to 
validate the identity of the service requestor. 
Furthermore, in the traditional client-server model, there is usually more than one client 
contacting the server at the same time. Therefore, the server needs to distinguish one client 
from another. In this case, a "session" is a single client's conversation with a logical server. 
But as e-business becomes more and more complex, especially with the advent of Web 
service, it is normal that several organizations cooperate together to achieve a business goal. 
In this case the traditionally session seems insufficient in expressing the complex 
relationships among the partners within a business flow. Hada and Maruyama [HAD02] 
describe the idea of multi-party session in their paper. They defined a session in the Web 
service world as a series of operations executed by Web service instances that need to share a 
common state, and listed some new issues in this field. As with their definition, a session is in 
fact a Web service flow instance. 
Based upon the above discussion, it is easy to see that a multi-party authentication mechanism 
is needed to protect the security of Web service flows. With it, a participant within a session 
can prove its legal identity as a session partner to other participants within the same session in 
a secure way. 
In the following sections, we will introduce the conventional session management within the 
Kerberos authentication system and group key management algorithm for peer-to-peer group, 
which is a potential solution for multi-party session authentication issue we discussed above. 
2.4.2.1 Session Management in Kerberos 
To facilitate the illustration of Kerberos, we introduce following notations firstly. 
c 
v 
TGS 
AS 
Kx 
Ka,b (KA, s) 
EK[XIIY] 
TS 
A client principal 
A service principal 
A Ticket-Granting Server 
An Authentication Server 
Secure Key held by party X 
Session Key for party A and party lB 
Encrypted message of information A and information B with the key K 
Time Stamp 
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Kerberos [KAU02] is a famous network authentication protocol developed by MIT. The 
purpose of this protocol is to provide authentication for users and services. The Kerberos 
system is based on trusted third-party security servers, the authentication server (AS) and the 
ticket-granting server (TGS) [BEL91]. All information of the entities under their management 
is stored in the database. In Kerberos, every principle (user or service) holds a key, which has 
been registered with the AS. The users' keys are derived from their passwords, while the 
services' keys are selected randomly. Furthermore, a kind of short time secret key - session 
key is employ in Kerberos to secure the communications within the session. 
As Figure 8 details, Kerberos assigns and distributes a session key for a particular session 
with a six-step conversation among the client, security servers and the service. 
(5) C ~V: Ticket,// Authenticator, 
(6) V ~C: EK'·' ~~' [TS4+1] (for mutual authentication) 
Figure 8 Summary of Kerberos version 4 message exchange [ST A98] 
Assume C intends to access V, which is under the management by Kerberos. Firstly, C sends 
a message to AS (see Step 1 in Figure 8). This message includes the identity of C, the identity 
of TGS which C should contact in the future and a time stamp TS~. which allows AS 
verifying that the clock of C is synchronized with AS [ST A98]. AS responds to C with a 
message, which is encrypted with Kc (see Step 2). This message includes a key Kc. tgs. the 
authentication information Ticket1gs for TGS, the time-stamp TS2 and some other additional 
information (e.g., ID1gs , Lifetime2) . Such information proves that the Tickettgs is for TGS and 
prevents replay attack. Since Kc is shared by AS and C secretly, this message cannot be 
decrypted by any clients other than C. 
After verifying the message received from AS, C contacts TGS asking for the key to access 
K (Step 3). TGS decrypts Ticket1gs with the key that it shares with AS and extracts Kc. tgs from 
Ticket1gs· Additionally, with other information in Ticket1gs (i .e., IDe, TS2) TGS can examine 
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the validity of this ticket. Afterwards, TGS uses Kc. tgs to decrypt Authenticatorc and compare 
the information regarding user C in Authenticatorc with the related information in the 
Ticket1gs· If all the examination is successful, TGS sends the reply back to C (see Step 4) and 
this reply is encrypted with the session key Kc. tgs to protect the confidentiality of the message. 
At this stage, C shares the session key Kc. v with V. Steps 5 and 6 achieve a mutual 
authentication for C and V. After this process, C can ensure that V has gotten Kc. v. and vice 
versa. 
In brief, Kerberos is an authentication system designed for the Client/Server model, and the 
session in Kerberos only consists of two session partners [HAD02]. So Kerberos cannot be 
employed directly to provide the authentication for the session partners within a multi-party 
session. 
2.4.2.2 Group Key Generation Algorithms 
Traditional authentication systems (e.g. Kerberos, SSL) are commonly based on the 
Client/Server paradigm. They can help the two entities at both ends of the conversation to 
generate some kind of trust relationship. On the other hand, many emerging network 
applications (e.g., online games, distributed simulations, conferencing) require multiple 
entities dynamically composing and working together. We call this kind of applications as 
dynamic peer groups. 
Group key generation algorithms can generate and distribute security keys for dynamic peer 
groups. In a dynamic peer group, the group membership is not known in advance, that is, the 
parties may join and leave the multicast group at any given time [BREOl]. In this case, 
dynamic peer groups share identical feature with Web service flows. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to take dynamic peer group authentication protocols into consideration as potential 
candidates to improve the security of Web service flows. Normally, there are two main ways 
to generate and manage a group secret: 
o Centralized: the group key is entirely generated by a single party who then 
distributes it to all other group members [MAIOO]. To implement a 
centralised key management system, we can assign a Trusted Third Party 
(TIP), which is something like the authority server in the Koreros system, 
or fix a certain partner of the group to generate and distribute the group 
secret. The session authentication system described in [HAD02] is a 
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centralised key management system, which relies on the TTP [MAIOO], and 
we will discuss its drawbacks in the next chapter. 
o Contributory: each group member makes an independent contribution to the 
group key [STE98]. Furthermore, there are two kinds of Contributory key 
management protocols, which have slightly different flavours [STE98]. 
);;> Partially Contributory: some operations are contributed to by each 
member and others are centralized. 
);;> Fully Contributory: all key agreement operations are contributed to 
by each group member. 
Let M={M1 , ••• , Mn) be a set of users wishing to share a key Sn. The GDH.2 protocol 
executes in n rounds. In the first stage (n-1 rounds) contributions are collected from 
individual group members and then, in the second stage (n-th round) the group keying 
material is broadcast. The actual protocol is as follows: 
Initialisation: 
Let p be a prime and q a prime divisor of p-1. Let G be the unique cycle subgroup of Z*p 
of order q, and let a be a generator of G. 
Round i ( 0 < i < n): 
I. M; selects r; E Z*q randomly. 
2. M; ~ M;+t: { art... rnlri I i E [1, i] }, art... rn 
Round n: 
I. Mn selects rn E Z*q randomly. 
2. Mn~ All M;: { a rl... mlri I i E [1, n[} 
Figure 9 Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH.2) [ATEOO] 
Figure 9 illustrates a classic group key generation algorithm - Group Diffie-Hellman, which 
can be used to implement a fully contributory group key management protocol. The Group 
Diffie-Hellman algorithm extends the Diffie-Hellman algorithm so that multiple entities can 
use it to generate and distribute a secret key in a decentralised way. 
The drawbacks of this algorithm are obvious (in fact, these drawbacks are common for this 
kind of decentralised group key generation algorithms). It is easy to see that Mn plays an 
important role in the key generation in GDH.2. It broadcasts the information to all the other 
group partners and they use the information to generate the group key. That means it must be 
a reliable and honest party. Otherwise, it can perform attacks without detection by other group 
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members, for example, partitioning the group into two [ATEOO]. However, in some case, 
especially in peer groups, it is difficult to assign a fixed party to act as M 11 , unless a TIP is 
assigned for the group. 
Furthermore, huge recourse consumption is a fatal drawback of the Group Diffie-Hellman 
algorithm. In order to generate a group key within a group with n group partners, all the 
partners must process for n rounds and exchange 2(n-l) messages on the whole. Also, when 
an entity takes party in or leaves a group, all the group partners must be informed and the 
group key must be refreshed. 
Therefore, this kind of decentralised group generation key algorithms is not suitable for a 
group whose partners are scattered in a large area, and it is not suitable for the environment in 
which the communication channel is not secure. Furthermore, the high overhead of message 
transport makes this kind algorithm only suitable for a group only with limited partners. 
2.5 Summary 
Web services are new developments based on the idea of SOA. Compared to previous 
technologies, Web services have many unique characteristics. These characteristics give new 
challenges to the security systems. Before a new technology is accepted by the industry, the 
security issues of it must be understood and resolved. In this chapter, we introduced the Web 
service mechanism and the new security challenges associated with it. In addition, we 
discussed the new security challenge in session authentication management for Web services, 
which this paper is concerned with. 
It is notable that WSFL only specifies the representation of the Web services which are 
involved within the flow. WSFL does not describe how to represent the Web service instances 
within a Web service flow instance since it is impossible to assign related Web services 
instances before a Web service flow is executed. Nevertheless, when a Web service flow is 
executed, the entities working within it are Web service instances rather Web services. 
Therefore, when a Web service flow is in process, an additional mechanism is needed to 
manage the Web service instances within the flow instance, as WSFL specification does not 
provide this function. 
Based upon the above discussions, we arrive at the conclusion that it is necessary to develop a 
novel message-level multi-party authentication system for Web services that is independent of 
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transporting protocol. This system should provide unified identifiers to the Web service 
instances within a session (i.e., session partners) and should enable them to ascertain that it 
only communicates with the partners within the same session. 
In the next chapter, we will first discuss a solution proposed by Hada and Maruyama. We will 
then introduce our solution, which assigns every partner within the session a unique identifier, 
and we will describe our efforts to employ CA action to enhance their solution with threat 
confinement ability. 
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As stated in the previous chapters, a new session authentication protocol is needed to improve 
the security of Web service flow. In this chapter, we will first introduce Hada and 
Maruyama's solution, the first in this field [HAD02]. Next, we will discuss the drawbacks and 
disadvantages of their solution. Finally, we will introduce our work on improving their 
solution. 
3.1 Hada and Maruyama's Session Aultlhtentncation Protocol 
Hada and Maruyama [HAD02] proposed an approach in order to authenticate session 
participants without prior knowledge of all parties participating in the session. In their 
solution there is a TIP, Session Authority (SA), which takes charge of distributing session 
authentication messages. An instance of SA is associated with a session. The SA instance 
assigns a session key (i.e. a session secret) to a particular session and distributed it secretly to 
the service instances of that session. If two instances hold the same session secret, they will be 
regarded as the participants within the same session. Then, the instances participating in that 
session can use this session secret to authenticate each other and distinguish them from the 
service instances involved in other sessions. 
The protocol consists of two parts: a message authentication protocol and a session 
management protocol. The message authentication protocol transports authentication 
information between session participants, while the session management protocol is in charge 
of starting, running, and ending a particular session. These two protocols work together to 
provide basic management of the session. 
Figure 10 describes a case [HAD02] of the session management protocol: Online Session 
Management. 
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Figure 10 Online Session Management [HAD02] 
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First, a requester instance initiates a session by sending a <StartSession> message to the 
SA (Step 1 ). The requester will receive a session secret from the SA (Step 2) and then send an 
application message to a Web service, Service#l, over the session authenticator (Step 3). On 
receiving the message, the service is given the session handle and asked to join the session. 
Next, the service creates a new service instance and transfers control to the instance (Step 4). 
The instance will send a <J o inSe ss i o n > message to the SA (Step 5) and receive later the 
session secret from the SA (Step 6). It will then have the session secret so as to authenticate 
any received message and obtain the payload. If the service instance needs to delegate its 
operation to some other service, it can send a message to another Web service, Service#2, 
using the session authenticator (Step 7). The same process happens in the second service 
provider (Steps 8-10) and the service instance of the second service provider will then have 
the session secret. This service instance can send a message to the original requester using the 
session authenticator (with the same session secret) so that the requester knows that the 
second service instance is a legitimate session participant. 
The case described above needs extra communication for service instances to acquire the 
session secret. There is an alternative that eliminates this extra communication: Offline 
Session Management. 
As presented in Figure 11, the Requester gets the session secret from the Session Authority, 
and this secret is transmitted to the new session partners over the network directly. These 
service instances then use this secret to prove their legal identities as session partners. 
Compared to Online Session Management, Offline Session Management mechanism is more 
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effective. The drawback of this mechanism is the disability of providing session partners the 
exact conditions about all the session. 
6.Spawn Instance 
5. Session 
Secret 
Figure 11 Offline Session Management [HAD02] 
From our point of view, this session authentication protocol is not a complete solution. There 
are still unsolved problems: 
o As mentioned in [HAD02], Hada and Maruyama's solution only provides a common 
session secret to all the participants within a given session rather than a unique 
identifier for each of them. An attacker, who has compromised a Web service 
instance and obtained the session secret, can use the secret to communicate with other 
session participants to gain their trusts. The attacker will then have opportunities to 
impersonate other session partners. It becomes difficult to confine the damage to a 
small area, rather than the entire session, even after it was detected that a session 
participant has been compromised. 
o The SA in their protocol does not have a measure to validate the identity of the Web 
service instance that applies to enter the session. Any Web service instance, as long as 
it holds the session ID, can contact the SA and apply to enter the session. An 
adversary may try to attack a session following this way. 
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3.2 Essential Knowledge of the New Session Authentication System 
3.2.1 Key Exchanges of the Diffie-Hellman Algorithm 
The Diffie-Hellman algorithm was firstly proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [STA98, 
MEN96]. Their protocol enables two users to communicate over public communication 
channels and safely exchange a key. 
The Security of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm relies on the difficulty of computing discrete 
logarithms. 
Consider the equation y = t mod p. 
Given g, x and p, we can easily calculate y. On the contrary, given y, g and p, it's difficult to 
calculate x in general, especially when p is a large prime. As we know, the asymptotically 
fastest known algorithm [ST A98] for taking discrete logarithms modulo a prime number is on 
the order of 
Obviously, it is especially difficult to get x from a given y when pis big number. 
We now describe this algorithm: 
Assume that there are two principles called Alice and Bob. They agree on a large prime p and 
an element g (2 :S g :S p-2), which is a primitive root of p. That is, the numbers g mod p, i 
mod p, i mod p, ... , g-1 mod pare some permutation of the distinct integers from 1 to p-1. 
Suppose: 
1. Alice chooses a random number x and Bob chooses a random number y 
from the set { 1, ... , p-2}. 
2. Alice keeps x private and sends t mod p to Bob. 
3. Bob keeps y private and sends gY mod p to Alice. 
4. Alice gets the Key = (g>}'' mod p = gX)' mod p 
5. Bob gets the Key = (gx)y mod p = gxy mod p 
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6. Alice and Bob then share the same Key = gX}' mod p. 
If Alice and Bob keep x andy secretly, the only information that an adversary can get are g, p, 
gx mod p, and Ef' mod p. The adversary has to utilize discrete logarithm to calculate the key. 
This is computationally difficult, particularly for large primes. 
3.2.2 Coordinated Atomic (CA) Actions 
A coordinated atomic (CA) action [XU95] is a mechanism for coordinating multi-thread 
interactions and ensuring a consistent access to objects in the presence of competitive 
concurrency and potential faults. 
CA action 
raised exception e 
exce tion handler H I 
return to nonnal 
Thread I -f--.------T---'-"',;_pen'!_ed _:o~tro_l_flo_w___.""-if--_. 
exception handler H2 
exit with success 
abnormal control flow 
'accesses 
"' repairs 
External Objects 
start transaction commit transaction 
Time 
Figure 12 Example of a CA action [RAN99, XU99] 
As shown in Figure 12, concurrent execution threads (e.g., Web service instance) 
participating in a given CA action enter and leave the action synchronously. Within theCA 
action, operations on objects can be performed cooperatively by roles executing in parallel. 
To cooperate in a CA action a group of concurrent threads must come together and agree to 
perform each role of the action, with each thread undertaking a different role. Inside a CA 
action, some or all of its roles can be involved in further (nested) CA actions. If an error is 
detected inside a CA action, appropriate forward and/or backward recovery measures must be 
invoked cooperatively by all the roles in order to reach a mutually consistent conclusion. An 
acceptance test can and should be provided in order to determine whether the outcome of the 
CA action is successful. The external objects which are being competed for must behave 
atomically with respect to other CA actions and threads so that they cannot be used as an 
implicit mean of "smuggling" information into or out of a CA action. 
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3.3 Instance ID Authenticator Protocol 
The following notations will be used in the rest of the paper. 
n A big prime number suitable for the Diffile-Hellman protocol 
G A primitive root of n 
l The abbreviation of l mod n 
Kx, y The security key shared by service instances X and Y 
MACx,vCM) Message Authentication Code for message M under key Kxy 
U (R, l) A service instance U whose private message is R and identifier is l 
Similar to Hada and Maruyama's solution, we present a protocol based on some standard 
Web services technologies such as SOAP, XML~Signature/Encryption, and WS-security. 
These protocols can meet certain security requirements in terms of confidentiality, Integrity, 
and Non-repudiation [NAK02], and we will thus not consider replay attacks and man-in-the-
middle attacks in our design. 
3.3.1 Operations of Instance ID Authenticator Protocol 
In this Instance ID Authenticator protocol, a session manager is a Web service, and it 
manages a given Web service session. The manager is composed of two parts: a Session 
Authority (SA) and a CAA manager that manages atomic actions for sessions. The SA is 
responsible for 1) storing and managing the identifiers of the session participants and 2) 
providing trusted information for each session participant. With such information, a message 
sender can specify the intended recipient, and so the message receiver can be sure that the 
received message comes from a proper sender. 
We assume in our protocol that 
D According to the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, each service instance of a given 
session selects a private secret number R randomly, and uses the public key 
gR as its identifier. The manager instance of the session guarantees that 
every identifier is unique within that session. 
D The manager instance's identifier is equal to the identifier of the session, 
and it must be different from those of other manager instances that belong 
to other sessions. 
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We present here essential operations for the instance ID Authenticator protocol. Session 
participants can use them to verify each other's identities. The messages of all the operations 
in our protocol should be appended with the authenticators that validate the originator and the 
integrity of the messages unless mentioned otherwise. Details of the authenticator will be 
described in section 3.3.2. 
3.3.1.1 Introduction-of-New-Instance 
A session participant can send the "Introduction-of-New-Instance" message to its manager 
instance to recommend a new service instance: 
<Introduction-of-New-Instance> 
<New-Instance type="uri" value="URI 
<NIID>ID of the new instance</NIID> 
</Introduction-of-New-Instance> 
of the new instance"/> 
The <NI ID> element within the message contains the identifier of the recommended service 
instance. 
3.3.1.2 Identifier-Query 
A service instance sends the "Identifier-Query" message to the manager instance to check 
the identifier of another session partner: 
<Identifier-Query> 
<Instance-under-query type="uri" value=" URI of the instance whose 
identifier the initiator instance want to know"/> 
</Identifier-Query> 
The reply from the manager instance is: 
<Identifier-Query-Result> 
<Instance-under-query-ID> 
ID of the checked instance 
</Instance-under-query-ID> 
<Instance-under-query type="uri" value="URI of the checked instance 
"I> 
</Identifier-Query-Result> 
3.3.1.3 Start-Communication 
If a service instance wants to start a communication with another instance of the session 
which it never contacted before, it should send the "Start-Communication" message to the 
intended instance: 
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<Start-Communication> 
<SessionHandle> 
<SA type="uri" value="URI of the SA"/> 
<ID> 
Session ID 
</ID> 
</SessionHandle> 
<SendingiD> 
ID of the sending service instance 
</SendingiD> 
<Sending-Instance type="uri" value="URI of the sending instance"/> 
</Start-Communication> 
Within the message, the initiator should provide the details of self so that the recipient 
instance can examine its identity when it is necessary. Mter the recipient receives and verifies 
this message, it will send the result back: 
<Start-Communication-Result> 
<Accept>true</Accept> 
</Start-Communication-Result> 
If the value of <Accept> element is true, that means the initiator has received the permission 
to start the communication. 
3.3.1.4 Validation 
When the recipient instance obtains the "Start-Communication" message from the initiating 
instance, the recipient instance should send the "Validation" message to the manager instance 
in order to verify the identifier of the initiating instance: 
<Validation> 
<Initiator type="uri" value="URI of the initiator instance"/> 
<Initiator-ID>ID of the initiator service instance</Initiator-ID> 
</Validation> 
Mter receiving this message, the SA instance will check the relative information and sends 
the result back: 
<Validation-Result> 
<Result>true</Result> 
</Validation-Result> 
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3.3.2 Generating amll Appemllmg the Autllnentlicator to Messages 
We now describe the details of how to append the identifiers of session participants and other 
security information to SOAP messages passed between Web service instances with SOAP: 
Step 1: A Web service instance prepares a SOAP envelope in order to send a message to 
participants of a given session. 
Step 2: The instance inserts the authentication information (e.g., session handle, the identifier 
of the sending instance, etc.) into the header of the envelope. An example of the code is as 
follows: 
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope 
xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<SOAP-ENV:Header> 
<Session-Authentication:Authentication 
xmlns:Session-Authentication="http://www.durham.com/"> 
<Session-Authentication:SessionHandle> 
<Session-Authentication: Manager type="uri" value="URI of the SM"/> 
<Session-Authentication:SessioniD> 
Session ID 
</Session-Authentication:SessioniD> 
</Session-Authentication:SessionHandle> 
<Session-Authentication:SendingiD> The ID of the sending instance 
</Session-Authentication:SendingiD> 
<Session-Authentication:ReceivingiD> 
The ID of the receiving instance 
</Session-Authentication:ReceivingiD> 
</Session-Authentication:Authentication> 
</SOAP-ENV:Header> 
<SOAP-ENV:Body> 
</SOAP-ENV:Body> 
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope> 
Step 3: The sending instance makes use of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to calculate a secret 
key with its private message and the identifier of the intended receiver. It will then utilise 
XML Signature to apply the Message Authentication Code (MAC), generated with the secret 
key, to the SOAP message. A code example is given as follows: 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope" 
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<S:Header> 
............ Other information about this SOAP message 
<wsse:Security 
xmlns:wsse="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2002/04/secext"> 
<ds:Signature> 
<ds:Signedinfo> 
40 
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm= 
"http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> 
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm= 
"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-shal"/> 
<ds:Reference URI="#MsgBody"> 
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm= 
"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#shal"/> 
<ds:DigestValue>LyLsDDPi4wPU ... </ds:DigestValue> 
</ds:Reference> 
</ds:Signedinfo> 
<ds:SignatureValue>DJbwhmSgK ... </ds:SignatureValue> 
<ds:Keyinfo> 
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
<wsse:Reference URI="#MyiD"/> 
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
</ds:Keyinfo> 
</ds:Signature> 
</wsse:Security> 
... same as the message in step 2 
</S:Header> 
<S:Body Id="MsgBody"> 
</S:Body> 
</S:Envelope> 
Step 4: The sending instance sends the SOAP message to the receiving instance. 
Step 5: After the receiver receives the message, it uses its own private key and the identifier of 
the sender to re-generate the secret key. The receiving instance will then generate the MAC 
using the secret key. By comparing the newly generated MAC with the MAC appended to the 
message, the receiver can verify the identity of the sender. 
3.3.3 A Scenario 
We use in this section a scenario to illustrate the operations of the instance ID Authenticator 
protocol. Consider a user service instance (UI(X, gx)) and a session manager service. 
First, Ul contacts the session manager to initiate a session and the session manager invokes a 
manager instance (MI(Y, gr)) to handle UI's request. After MI and UI exchange their 
identifiers, gx and gr, a session (Se(MI)) is initiated (see Figure 13). 
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Figure 13 Example of the authentication process 
Suppose that UI wants to contact Service 1. And a new service instance (NI(Z,l)) is invoked 
by Service 1 to manage UI' s request. UI and NI exchange their identifiers, gx and l. and 
some related information (e.g., URL of MI, l). UI then needs to send an "Introduction-of-
New-Instance" message to MI before MI accepts NI as a participant of the session (see 
Figure 14). 
Figure 14 Interactions between UI and NI 
Assume that another service instance (NI2(N, gN)) is invoked and recommended to MI (see 
Steps 1, 2 and 3 of Figure 15). Since NI2 does not know UI's identifier, it sends MI an 
"Identifier-Query" message to check UI's identity in order to communicate with UI. After 
getting UI' s identifier from MI, NI2 will send a "Start-Communication" message to UI. 
After receiving a message from NI2, UI needs to contact MI to verify the identity of NI2 
since it has not communicated with NI2 before. If the reply from MI is True, Ul will then 
verify the MAC appended with the message and send a reply back to NI2 (see Step 4). 
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Figure 15 Example of interactions between UI and NI2 
3.3.4 Security Analysis 
In our protocol, each service instance of a session has a private secret and a public identifier. 
The public identifier will be transported over the Internet while the private secrets are kept by 
the instances securely. The attacker cannot get the key shared by the instances participating in 
the communications from the plaintext and the MAC code [SCH96, STAOO]. If the 
participants can keep their private information secretly, it will be computationally difficult for 
an attacker to derive the key from the public information and thus impersonate one or more 
participants of the session. Moreover, a service instance that attempts to join a session must 
be "recommended" by a session participant to the session authority first. If a malicious 
instance outside of the session tries to communicate with any instance inside the session, it 
will be detected by the manager instance of that session. This further improves the security 
level of the system. 
3.4 Session Management Protocol 
The instance ID Authenticator protocol provides dependable authentication operations for 
participants of a given session and helps them authenticate each other. It works well in the 
case of simple business flows. We will now consider the following, more complicated, cases: 
o A participating service instance of a given session may have local 
operations, which are not supposed to be known by other participants. For 
instance, the participant may attempt to initiate a sub-workflow and does 
not want other participants to know any details of it. The protocol should 
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provide a mechanism for enclosing local details and secrets of session 
participants. 
o When an attacker has compromised a session participant, the instance ID 
Authenticator protocol has difficulty in confining the threat to a small area 
of the session. The attacker may recommend more malicious service 
instances into the session. 
In order to resolve these problems we introduce a session management protocol which uses 
the CA action mechanism to manage sessions so as to achieve a better level of attack 
confinement. 
3.4.1 Overview 
In the session management protocol, we use nested CA actions to structure a workflow. 
Nested actions could be pre-defined and invoked dynamically as required. A service instance 
or role in a CA action is only permitted to communicate with other roles in the same action. 
What happens in a nested CA action is completely transparent to the enclosing action. This 
provides a protection mechanism for the roles within the CA action. Any service instance 
invoked by a role of a CA action must be terminated at the point in time when that CA action 
ends. In addition, the CA action support mechanism is responsible for monitoring the state of 
roles. CAA manager must ensure that there are no errors or exceptions unresolved (including 
the possibility of signalling an exception to the enclosing action) when the CA action ends. If 
an attacker or a malicious service instance is found in a CA action, the thread and damage 
must be limited to that CA action. While a transaction model may offer some similar features, 
we select CA action scheme for the reason that CA action scheme has a powerful ability to 
handle concurrent exceptions [RAN99, XU99]. In a given session, multiple instances may be 
running concurrently, and an error may involve more than one instance. In order to resolve 
this type of errors, the instances involved should take actions collectively. CA actions provide 
an appropriate mechanism for handling such concurrent exceptions. 
3.4.2 Management Operations of CA Actions 
We define five basic protocol operations that provide functions for manage a set of nested CA 
actions. 
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3.4.2.1 §tart-an-OriginaB-CA-Action 
A user can send the "Start-an-Originai-CA-Action" to its session manager to initiate a new 
session. Since the user has not exchanged the identifiers with the session manager instance, 
this message is not appended with the authenticator. 
<Start-an-Original-CA-Action > 
<SendingiD> The ID of the sending instance 
</SendingiD> 
............ some other information (e.g. the details of the original CA 
action) 
</Start-an-Original-CA-Action > 
The session manager invokes a new manager instance, including an SA instance and a CAA 
manager instance, and the manager instance sends the following message back: 
<Start-an-Original-CA-Action-Result> 
<SessionHandle> 
<Manager type="uri" value="URI of Manager"/> 
<ID> 
Session ID 
</ID> 
</SessionHandle> 
</Start-an-Original-CA-Action-Result> 
From now on, the session is under the management of the original CA action. 
3.4.2.2 Start-a-Nested-CA-Action 
If a service instance tries to invoke a nested CA action, it should send this message to its 
present CAA manager, which is a part of the session manager instance: 
<Start-a-Nested-CA-Action> 
<CAHandle> 
<CA type="uri" value="URI of the CA"/> 
<ID>CAA manager ID</ID> 
</CAHandle> 
<NCAHandle> 
<NCA type="uri" value="URI of the NCA"/> 
<Policy> 
Policy about the nested CA action and other relative information 
about the roles 
</Policy> 
</NCAHandle> 
<SendingiD> The ID of the sending instance 
</SendingiD> 
............ some other information 
</Start-a-Nested-CA-Action> 
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If CAA manager accepts this application, it invokes a new nested CAA manager instance and 
sends the nested manager instance's related information back: 
<Start-a-Nested-CA-Action-Result> 
<accept>true</accept> 
<NCAHandle> 
<NCA type="uri" value="URI of the NCA"/> 
<NCAID>Nested CAA manager instance's ID </NCAID> 
</NCAHandle> 
</Start-a-Nested-CA-Action-Result> 
3.4.2.3 Inform-Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action 
After a new nested CAA manager instance is invoked, the nesting CAA manager instance 
sends the "Inform-Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action" message to all the service instances which 
are expected to act as roles of that nested CA action and inform them to enter that nested CA 
action: 
<Inform-Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action> 
<CAHandle> 
<CA type="uri" value="URI of the CA"/> 
<ID>CAA manager's ID</ID> 
</CAHandle> 
<NCAHandle> 
<NCA type="uri" value="URI of the NCA"/> 
<NCAID>Nested CAA manager instance's ID </NCAID> 
<Role> .......... </Role> 
</NCAHandle> 
<SendingiD> The ID of the sending instance 
</SendingiD> 
............ some other information 
</Inform-Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action>-
3.4.2.4 Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action 
With the permission of entering a nested action, a service instance may decide not to enter 
that action immediately. After finishing its present job, the instance sends the "Enter-a-
Nested-CA-Action" message to the nested CAA manager, informing the manager that this 
instance is ready to enter the nested CA action and is under the control of the manager from 
now on: 
<Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action> 
<NCAHandle> 
<NCA type="uri" value="URI of the NCA"/> 
<NCAID>Nested CAA manager instance's ID 
</NCAID> 
<Role> ........ </Role> 
</NCAHandle> 
<SendingiD> The ID of the sending instance 
</SendingiD> 
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</Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action> 
After the nested CAA manager obtains this message and verifies the MAC appended with the 
message, it sends a reply back to the sending instance: 
<Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action-Result> 
<accept>true</accept> 
<NCAHandle> 
<NCA type="uri" value="URI of the NCA"/> 
<NCAID> nested CAA manager instance's ID 
</NCAID> 
<Role> ........ </Role> 
</NCAHandle> 
</Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action-Result> 
3.4.2.5 CA-Action-End 
When the original (outermost) CA action ends, all the session ends. When a CA action 
finishes, the CAA manager sends the "CA-Action-End" message to all the roles of that CA 
action. This message includes information about the state of the CA action at the point of 
termination: 
<CA-Action-End> 
<Result>Success</Result> 
<CAHandle> 
<CA type="uri" value="URI of the CA"/> 
<CAID>ID of CAA manager instance</CAID> 
</CAHandle> 
</CA-Action-End> 
From the "CA-Action-End" message, the roles are informed that the CA action has ended 
successfully. After having received the replies from all the roles, the CAA manager 
terminates the CA action. 
3.4.3 A Scenario 
In this section, we use the previous scenario described in Section 3.3.3 again to illustrate how 
the session management protocol works with the instance ID Authenticator protocol. 
As shown in Figure 16, suppose that UI first sends a "Start-an-Original-CA-Action" 
message to the session manager in order to start a new session. An instance of session 
manager MI (including a SA instance and an original CAA manager instance) is created and 
invoked. 
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MI 
Figure 16 Invoking the Original CA action 
UI then invokes the service instance NI and NI invokes the service instance Nl2. Once these 
service instances have been accepted as participants of the session, the CAA manager instance 
will regard them as instances invoked in the Original CA action (see Figure 17). 
UI 
UI 
I.UI 
invokes 
NI 
Nl 
MI 
(OCAm) 
3.NI 
invokes NI2 
NI2 
Figure 17 Invoking new service instances within the 
Original CA action 
In order to enclose the operations between NI2 and UI into a nested CA action, NI2 needs to 
send a "Start-a-Nested-CA-Action" message to MI and applies for the creation of a new 
nested CA action. After MI invokes a new nested session manager instance (CI(C, gc)), it 
sends an "lnform-Enter-a-Nested-CA-Action" message to UI and NI2, permitting them to 
enter that nested CA action. When UI and NI2 are ready, they send an "Enter-a-Nested-CA-
Action" message to the nested CAA manager instance separately. UI also has to use Ku1,CI = 
gxc to authenticate itself to the nested CAA manager and then enter the nested action. 
Similarly, NI2 uses gNc to identify itself. After UI and NI2 have entered the nested CA action, 
they are all under the control of the nested CAA manager (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18 Invoking a nested CA action 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented the design of our multi-party authentication protocols for 
Web Services and used the XML notation to specify the corresponding operations. Our 
protocol is designed for complex Web services applications running over the Internet. Since 
Web services may belong to different organizations and under the control of different security 
systems, our protocol is intentionally designed to be independent of any particular security 
systems. We have used the Diffie-Hellman scheme to exchange the authentication 
information and CA actions to structure nested business flow. Compared to Hada and 
Maruyama's scheme [HAD02], our protocol is improved in authenticating service instances 
for complex sessions and defending against a variety of attacks. The following chapter 
introduces the model analysis of our system and the results obtained from the experiment. 
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Chapter 4 System Evaluation and Formal Analysis 
We have developed an experiment to evaluate the performance of our protocols. We also 
design an analytic model to further support the conclusions of the experiment, as the 
experiment can only partly simulate real life environments. 
4.1 Description of the Experiment 
4.1.1 Introduction of Programming Language and Tools 
In the experiment, we employ Java to implement the experiment system. Java is an object-
oriented language developed by Sun Microsystems to provide a programming language that 
can be used on a variety of platforms. Because of its platform-independence, Java has been 
widely used in e-business application development and has been accepted by the industry. 
Furthermore, it provides a very good exception mechanism. 
In addition, we make use of GLUE toolkits to generate experimental Web services, which 
communicate based on the SOAP protocol. GLUE is a complete Web service platform 
provided by The Mind Electric. The platform itself provides extensive support for SOAP, 
WSDL, and UDDI. It is easy to use and fast at creating and deploying applications with Web 
services. 
4.1.2 Structure of the Experiment 
Our session multi-party authentication system is designed for large scale, with a large 
mumber of users, and should work in a distributed environment. Normally, operations in a 
distributed system may be executed simultaneously and the performance of the system is 
sometimes difficult to evaluate. Therefore, in the experiment, we try to simulate the worst 
case, where all the operations of the system are executed consequentially. Thus, we 
implement the experiment in the following way (see Figure 19). 
A Web service is developed as the session authenticator and three Web services (Web service 
1, Web service 2, and Web service 3 in Figure 19) are developed to spawn the Web service 
instances that act as session partners in the experiment. Web services 1, 2 and 3 invoke each 
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other in the sequence shown in Figure 19 repeatedly until they have spawned a particular 
amount of services instances and introduced them into the session. The amount of the session 
partners within a particular session is managed by the first Web service instance generated by 
Web service 1. The function of this service instance is to contact the session manager to 
initiate a session as well as end it at the proper time. In this service instance, a pre-set counter 
is used to specify the amount of session partners. 
For an example, in order to establish a session with six partners and record the time consumed 
to accomplish this session, the counter should be set as two and then Web service 1 generates 
a new instance to start a new session. When the service instance spawned by Web service 3 
in the first turn contacts Web service 1, Web service 1 will check the counter in the first 
generated instance. If the counter is bigger than one, Web service 1 will then reduce the 
counter by one and contact Web service 2 to start another turn. Else, Web service 1 will 
inform the session authority to end the session and calculate the time consumption of this 
sessiOn. 
Session 
Manager 
Web service 3 
Figure 19 Structure of the experiment 
After the instances invoked by these three Web services have finished their jobs, they will be 
disposed of to release the resources. Therefore, in one session there are only two or three 
session partners occupying the memory simultaneously even when this system is simulating a 
session with large number of partners. This design avoids the case that the system consumes 
so many resources that the precision of the experiment result is affected. 
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Since all the operations in this experiment should be executed sequentially, it would be 
reasonable to execute the experiment on a computer with one CPU. However, in order to 
make the experiment more convincing, we have done this experiment both on a single 
computer and in a LAN environment. The results getting from the two cases have the same 
tendencies. 
41.2.1 Standard! Deviation oft' ExperimeJrnt Resu.nnts 
To our certain knowledge, there are several factors which may influence the performance of 
the experiment: 
o Java shields the garbage collection from developers. The Java virtual 
machine (JVM) can free the resources no longer needed by the program 
automatically. This mechanism benefits the software development. 
However, the unpredictable overhead of the garbage collection mechanism 
also affects the performance of the Java program and makes it relatively 
less stable. 
o The operation system used in the experiment is Windows 2000. And the 
API System. currentTimeMillis () is used to get the system time at 
the begin and the end of the experiment. The subtraction of the two times is 
regarded as the time consumption of the experiment. However, the 
operation of the experiment process may be interrupted by the operation 
system backend management mechanism unpredictably. Therefore, the 
result from the experiment may be longer than the time that the experiment 
has really consumed. 
o The private key of each Web service instance in the experiment is randomly 
selected. Therefore, the time consumption of generating public keys and 
secret keys based on these random numbers varies in different runs of the 
experiment, although in theory the average result should approach to a limit 
when large numbers of the private keys are used. 
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It is therefore necessary to investigate how much variation these factors will cause. In order to 
evaluate the impact of these factors, we repeated the data collection process of each different 
operation fifteen times (see Figures 20, 21 and 22). 
Time overhead to generate 1500 private keys 
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Figure 20 Time consumed to generate private keys 
Time consumed to generate 1500 Diffie-Hellman key pairs 
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Figure 21 Time consumed to generate key pairs 
Time consumed to invoke services instances (1500) and generate 
the communication 
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Figure 22 Time consumed to invoke services instances (1500) and generate the 
communication 
53 
As what Figures 20, 21 and 22 illustrate, the standard deviation of the results from different 
runs of the experimentation is relatively small, and so the influence of the factors described 
above is generally negligible. 
4.2.2 System Scalability 
In the experiment shown in Figure 23, different sessions with the number of partners ranging 
from 300 to 1500 were generated to evaluate the scalability of the system. The curves from 
the experiment indicate that the time consumed in accepting new service instances into a 
session is proportional to the number of session partners, wruch is an acceptable result. 
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--O-bit private key 
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--360-bit private key 
--480-bit private key 
--512-bit private key 
Figure 23 Scalability of the session authentication system 
4.2.3 Concurrency 
In order to evaluate the actual performance of the session authentication system when 
concurrency is allowed, two experiments have been conducted. In the first experiment (see 
Figure 24), we established seven kinds of sessions whose number of partners varied from 
three to ten and collected the data of the performance load of a maximum of ten simultaneous 
sessions. It is noted that the curves of the sessions' time consumptions are approximately 
linear. 
However, it may be possible that these curves in Figure 24 do not reflect the real feature of 
the system concurrent performance because the number of simultaneous sessions is not large 
enough. 
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Figure 24 Current performance of the system (experiment 1) 
So, more sessions are executed concurrently in the second experiment. It is obvious that the 
increasing speed of the time consumed for achieving a session reduces gradually as more 
sessions are involved into the experiment (see Figure 25). 
However when more than 50 sessions are executed concurrently, some messages transported 
between service instances are denied due to the limits on the amount of simultaneous 
messages that a Web server can handle. The system will become unstable in that condition. 
Thus, the curve in Figure 25 is only reliable up to fifty concurrent sessions. However, from 
that part of the curve, we can obtain the same result that we mentioned above. 
Concurrent Performance 
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Concurrent Sessions 
Figure 25 Current performance of the system (experiment 2) 
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4.2.4 Calculation Speed of Web Services 
Normally, when we execute a Java program on the same computer more than once, the 
performance of different experimentations is similar. However, the performance of Web 
services seems to be different. Figure 26 compares the different performance of a Web service 
and a normal Java program to generate 1500 120-bit private keys on the same computer. 
Time consumed to generate 1500 120-bit private keys 
Ul 6000 
.. - - - - - -
-g 5000 \ 0 g 4000 \ .....,._Web service ~ 3000 
I 2ooo \ 
Ill 1000 \ -Normal Java program E \. ;:: 0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Test 
Figure 26 Performance comparison of a Web service and normal a Java program 
The time consumption of the normal Java program is similar each time while that of the Web 
service becomes much faster after the first time. From the second time onwards, the Web 
service' s performance becomes stable. Thus in the experiment, we always collect the data 
after the Web service's performance stabilizes and use these data to evaluate the Web 
service's time consumption. We explain this phenomenon as follows. When the user invokes 
a Web service for the first time, the object of the service will be generated and kept in 
memory. If the user contacts it later, the Web service will invoke the object from the memory 
directly rather than instantiate it again. 
4.3 Model Analysis of the Session Authentication System 
Since the experiments can only partially simulate the Web service sessions with a limited 
number of session partners, we also create an analytical model to further analyse these 
experimental results . 
4.3.1 Notation 
We frrstly introduce the following notations to facilitate subsequent discussions. 
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T;nst,I 
Tkey-pair(j, i) 
Service instance which is the i-th instance introduced into the session 
The time consumed of spawning a new service instance PI 
The time consumed to generate the j-th private key and public key in 
the process of introducing PI into the session 
The time consumed to generate the j-th secret key in the process of 
introducing PI into the session 
The time consumed to generate and transport the j-th message 
between two Web service instances in the process of introducing PI 
into the session 
4.3.2 Time Consumption of Introducing a New Session Partner to the Session 
Authority 
In our model, a user instance first contacts a session authority to initiate a session and the 
session authority then assigns a SA instance to manage this session. The user is regarded as 
the first session partner of the session. From then on, a new service instance must be 
recommended to the session authority before it is accepted as a session partner. Normally, this 
task is performed by the session partner, which invoked this new service instance (see the 
Session partner in Figure 27). 
As with the presentation of Figure 27, when a partner of a session attempts to recommend a 
newly generated Web service instance to the session authority of the session, at least five 
messages should be sent over the network. Firstly, the session partner sends a request to 
access a Web service (see Step 1). Besides the request, other useful information such as the 
identity of the session partner is also sent. After the Web service receives the message, it 
spawns a new service instance to manage the request. The new service instance selects its 
private key randomly from the key space, calculates its public key and sends the public key as 
its identifier back to the session partner (see Step 2). After receiving the reply from the new 
instance, the session partner forwards the new instance's identifier to the session authority 
instance, which holds all the information of the session partners within that session. If the 
session authority realizes that the identifier of the new instance has already been adopted by 
another session partner, the session authority will inform the recommender that the register 
has been refused. In this case, the recommender should inform the new service instance to 
select a new private key (see Step 6). Steps 2, 3 and 4 are repeated until the session partner 
gets confirmation from the session authority that the new instance has been accepted. After 
receiving the confirmation, the session partner sends a message (message 5) to inform the 
new service instance to start working. 
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Transported messages: 
Session 
Authority 
0 : Invoke a new Web service instance 
Web service 
8 : Send the Identifier of the new instance back 
C): Recommend the new instance to the session authority 
0: Confrrm that the new instance has been registered 
0: Inform the new instance to start running. 
0: Inform the new instance to select another new private key 
Generated secret keys: 
New Service Instance 
0 Secret key agreed with by the session partner and the new service instance 
0 Secret key agreed with by the session authority and the new service instance 
Figure 27 The process of registering a new instance to the session authority 
Let us now consider a session partner that attempts to introduce a newly spawned Web 
service instance P1 to the session authority, and this process achieves after x; identity 
selections. The total time consumption of this process T total. I is as follows: 
41;-fl ... J;.l(-fl) 
T total, I ~ L (Tmu. o)+ L ( Tkey-pairlj, o) + L (Tsecu.o) + T;nst, I (1) 
j-4 j=t j-4 
with equality when all the operations of the system are processed sequentially. 
Therefore, in one session where n service instances are accepted into the session, the total 
time consumption of this process T n-totai could be expressed in the following way: 
n 
T tr-total = L T,ota/, 1 
i=l 
n 4x1 +1 x1 2(x1 +1) 
~ L ( L (T,.( j, i)) + L (l'key-pair(j, i)) + L (Tsec(j, i)) + T;nst , I ) 
i=l j=l j=l j=l 
2[(x1 + x2 + .. + xn) + n](Tsecret ) + nT;nstant 
58 
(2) 
11 4x;+l L( L(1~n(j,i))) 
where Tmessage = i=l j=l 
11 2x;+l 
L ( L (T<ec(j, i))) 
i=l j=l 
--"------- and T instant 
II 
L(2xi +1) 
i=l 
Tkey-pair = 
II 
L ('F;nst,l) 
= ...!Ci=::!l __ _ 
n 
n xi 
L <:L (Tkey-pair(j, i))) 
i=l j=l 
Tsecret = 
i=l 
Given a random variable that is an integer with uniform distribution between I and n and a 
selection of k instances (k :S n) of random variable, the probability, P(n, k), that there is at 
least one duplicate is [STA98]: 
n! 
P(n, k) = 1- k (n-k)!n 
If the Key space of the security system is large enough, the probability that two partners 
within the same session will select the same private key is extremely small. Thus, for every i 
in { 1,2, .. . ,n }, X; z 1. Thus the value of ( ~ + x2 + .. + xn) in equation (2) is approximately n. 
Therefore, when all the operations execute sequentially: 
T n-toral z 5n(T message) + n(T key-pair) + 4n(T secret) + nT instance (3) 
= n[5(Tmessage) + T key-pair+ 4T secret+ Tinstance] 
Equation (3) implies that, in order to accept n service instances into a session, there will be 
about 5n messages transported, n key pairs, 4n secret keys, and n new service instances 
generated. That is, in the worst case the time consumption of introducing service instances 
into one session increases linearly with the amount of the session partners. 
4.3.3 Time Consumption of Initiating the Communication between Session 
Partners 
We also generated an analytic model of our security system for generating the communication 
between session partners. 
Figure 28 illustrates the conversation between two session partners, Initiator and Responder, 
which tried to initiate a communication between each other. Since these two session partners 
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never communicated before, each of them has to ask the session authority instance to examine 
the other's identity. Generally, there are six messages that have to be sent through the network. 
Initiator will agree on a secret key with Responder. 
Let T8cc;,1) be the time consumption of the process for two partners, P1 and P;, to agree on the 
secret key. And 
2 6 
Tgc(i,J) :::; LT:·ecret(i,j) ,u + LT,nessage(i , j) ,u (4) 
u=l u=l 
In the above inequality we refer to the time consumption of generating the u-th secret key in 
this process as T.ecret(i, n.u and the time consumption of generating and transporting the u-th 
message in this process as T,nessage(i, i) ,u. Equality is achieved when all the operations in the 
process are executed sequentially. 
From inequality (4), we can say that the resources consumed to authenticate a session partner 
do not vary as the change of the membership of the session or the relationship among the 
session partners. If Initiator and Responder have contacted before, then there is no 
additional operation needed. They should have generated the secret key and can use it directly 
to prove their identities. Of course, the session partners can contact the session authority 
instance to verify each other again for security purposes. 
Initiator Responder 
Transported messages 
0: Request the identifier of Responder from the session authority 
8: Return the identifier of Responder back to Initiator 
0: Send request to Responder 
8: Check the identity oflnitiator to the session authority 
0 : Send the validation result back to Responder 
0: Send the reply to Initiator according the validation result 
Figure 28 The process of contacting other session partners 
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Assuming there is a session, in which there are n partners never communicate with each other 
before. The time it takes every partner to form original connections with all the other session 
partners Tgac should be: 
n j-1 
Tgac = L L (Tgc(i, J)) 
j=2 i=l 
n j-1 2 6 
~L:L: (LT,·ecret(i,j),u + LT,11essage(i,j),11 
n j-2 2 
j=2 i=l u=l u=l 
n(n -1) -
---(2Tsecret +6Tmessage) 
2 
n j-2 6 
L L (L T.ecret(i, j),u) L L (L T,nessage(i, j), u) 
Wh T j=3 i=l u=l j=3 i=l u=l ere secret = -'-----,----:j-c-2=---- and T secret = -'----"----'" --:-j_-::2----
LL2 L::L6 
j=3 i=l j=3 i=l 
The time complexity of above inequality equation is O[n2 ]. 
(5) 
In the above discussion, we have described the process of our security system for two session 
partners initiating communication. In Section 4.4, we will compare this model with the model 
of another decentralised solution. 
4.3.4 Comparison of the Results of the System and the Model 
In the experiment, the transporting channel is stable. Therefore, the time consumption of 
transporting a message between two instances and spawning a service instance is stable. 
Every session partner spawned by the same service in the experiment has the same calculating 
ability since all these instances are executed on the same computer. 
In addition, it is impossible to anticipate the time consumption of generating a public key or a 
secret key precisely in the experiment. However, we can predicate that: 
As we described in Chapter 3, in the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, time consumption of 
generating a public key or a secret key is determined by the length of the private key. And the 
private key used in this system is a random number picked from the set {0, 1, ... , 2" -1} 
where n is selected by the system according to the requirement of the security strength. When 
the system employs Diffie-Hellman to agree with the secret keys, n is normally twice as the 
length of the session keys that are derived from the security keys. 
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If i integers are selected randomly from the set {0, 1, ... , 2" -1 }, the average length of these 
random numbers is a limit when i is large enough. 
Therefore, when the number of session partners is large, as it is in our experiment, the value 
of the arguments in the right of the equation (3) should not have a large variation in different 
experimentations. Hence, we can record the time consumption of different operations such as 
transporting messages, generating private keys, public keys, and spawning service instances 
separately. Then, we can add them together to evaluate the performance of the system. 
In Figure 29, we include the time consumptions of achieving various sessions. These sessions 
consist of different numbers of session partners. The lengths of the private keys employed 
within the sessions are different from one column to another. Specially, the column "0 bit" in 
Figure 29 indicates the session that does not do the operations of generating the key pairs and 
validating secret keys, that is, it only records the time consumed to generate the service 
instance and the time consumed to generate and transport the messages. 
~ 0 bit 40 bits 120 bits 240 bits 360 bits 480 bits 512 bits 
300 1906 4768 7775 11516 15969 18016 20703 
450 2938 6562 11812 16688 22422 27640 32297 
600 3921 8079 15532 21579 29266 35609 39985 
750 4875 10042 19435 26891 36047 48609 48765 
900 5937 11750 22328 31532 43950 53453 60438 
1050 6953 13956 26016 36813 51078 67844 69047 
1200 8005 15344 29235 41453 68040 72812 80141 
1350 9328 16704 33500 47016 72219 81703 92781 
1500 11422 19375 36187 51812 76312 90172 100203 
Figure 29 Private key's length and the time consumption (millisecond) of the experiment 
system 
In addition, from the observation of the Diffie-Hellman protocol we can tell that the average 
time consumed to generate a public key is computationally close to a secret key. Let T pri be 
the average time consumed in generating a private key and T pub be that of a public key, 
equation (3) becomes 
T11-totat = n[5(Tmessage) + T key-pair+ 4T secret + T;tlstance] (6) 
::::: n[ 5(T message) + T pri + 5T pub + T in.>taiiCe] 
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Figure 30 Comparison between analytical and experimental results 
Based on the data collected from experiments (as what shown in Figures 20, 21 and 22), we 
use equation (6) to generate analytical results . Figure 30 shows that the analytical sum of time 
spent by different parts illustrated in Figures 20, 21 and 22 matches the experimental results 
presented in Figure 29. 
It is notable that the experimental results are always a little larger than the analytical results 
derived from equation (6) . This phenomenon may be explained as follows: 
The data shown in Figures 20 and 21 , used for the analytical model, is based on an 
implementation in which the keys are generated by a single Web service instance, one at a 
time. However, the experimental results, illustrated by Figure 29, are based on the fact that 
the keys generated by multiple service instances in total. The operations in the experimental 
system are therefore more possibly disturbed by the OS background management mechanism. 
Consequently, time consumption of the experimental system should be longer than that of the 
analytical model, especially when the system execution time is long. 
4.3.5 Proportion of Different Parts of Time Consumption 
Figure 31 shows the proportion of time consumed by different operations within the security 
system. The time consumption of generating private keys is less than 1 %, negligible 
compared with other operations. The time consumed in generating public keys and secret keys 
takes the most part of the system time consumption. However, we anticipate that the 
proportion of time consumed by transporting messages will increase when the system 
executes in a large-scale distributed system. In extreme conditions, the time consumption of 
transporting messages will determine the performance of the sy tern. 
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Time consumed to introduce 1500 instance into a session (480-bit 
private key, 512-bit public key) 
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messages 
0 Time conusmed to generate public 
keys and secret keys 
Figure 31 Time consumption of different operations in the system 
4.4 Decentralised Solution for Session Authentication Protocol 
Before choosing the solution described in Chapter 3 as our solution of the session 
authentication protocol, we had considered another decentralised mechanism, which does not 
rely on any third party to manage the identities of the session partners (see Figure 32). 
4.4.1 Description of the Decentralised Solution 
Like the centralised solution we described previously, this decentralised solution leverages 
the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to distribute secret keys among session partners. Session 
partners will use these secret key to authenticate each other in the conversations. In the 
decentralised solution, in order to invoke a new service instance, there are three messages 
necessary to be sent. Figure 32 illustrates a scenario of this process. 
Suppose a session partner InstantO is a service instance involved within a session, and it 
attempts to assess a Web service, Web service 1. Firstly, InstantO selects a pair of keys for 
itself and then sends its request to Web service 1 (see Step 1 in Figure 32). Apart from the 
request, InstanceO also sends its public key as its identifier to Web service 1. After receiving 
the message from InstanceO, Web service 1 invokes a new instance, lnstance1 to manage 
this request. Instance1 selects a private key from the key space and sends the associated 
public key as its identifier back to Session Partner (see Step 2 in Figure 32). After Steps 1 and 
2, InstanceO and lnstance1 have achieved the public key exchange so that they can agree on 
a secret key using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. In th third step of Figure 32, lnstantO 
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informs Instance! to start working after receiving the reply from Instance!. Same as our 
multi-party authentication system discussed in Chapter 3, the messages in Steps 2 and 3 are 
attached with MAC information calculated with the secret key that is shared by the InstanceO 
and Instancel so that these two service instances can verify the originators of the messages. 
After these three Steps conversation, each of them can make sure that the other instance has 
agreed on the secret key. Instance! can now be regarded as a session partner. 
Step I (0) 
c:>r---s_t...:.ep_2...:..C8.....:....) ___ ---.Jj Web service I ~--
---~S~te-p~3~(~~)~-~  
Session Partner 
(Instant 0) 
Transported messages: 
Instance 2 
0: Invoke a new Web service instance 
8: Send the Identifier of the new instance back 
~: Inform the new instance to start running. 
Figure 32 The process of invoking new session partner in the decentralised solution 
Assume Instancel tries to access another Web service, Web service 2. Following the same 
way, Instance! contacts Web service 2 and generates the communication with lnstance2 
which is invoked by Web service 2 to manage the request of Instance! (Steps 4, 5 and 6 in 
Figure 32). 
After lnstance2 has finished its job, it is required to send the result back to InstanceO 
directly (see Figure 33). Since at this stage lnstanceO and lnstance2 have both generated 
trust relationships with Instance!, lnstance2 can send its identifier to InstanceO through 
Instantl (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 33), and InstanceO can send its identifier back to 
lnstance2 through Instancel as well (Steps 3 and 4 ). 
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lnstance2 
Transported messages: 
0: Send Instance2's identifier to Instancel and ask Instancel forward it to InstanceO 
8: Send the Identifier to lnstanceO 
C): InstanceO sends its identifier back 
G: Instance! forwards InstanceO's identifier to Instance2 
0: Contact InstanceO 
CD : Return the validation result back to lnstance2 
Figure 33 The process of initiating communication with other 
session partners in the decentralised solution 
After Steps 3 and 4, Instance2 agrees on a secret key with InstanceO using the Diffie-
Hellman algorithm. Thus, lnstance2 can contact lnstanceO directly and use the newly 
generated secret key to prove its identity. 
4.4.2 Model Analysis of the Decentralised Solution 
Let us now consider partner within a session that invokes a service instance P1 and accept it to 
the session. A triple-message conversation is needed to invoke and generate the trust 
relationship with P1 over the network. Moreover, P1 should select a private key and the 
relevant public key for itself. We refer to the time consumption of this process as Tkey-pair, I· In 
addition, the two parties of the conversation should generate the secret key respectively. So, 
the time consumption of accepting P1 into the session T rowl, 1 is: 
3 2 
T total, I L Tm(j, o+ Tkey-poir, I + L TsecG, i) + T;nsl , I , 
j=l j=l 
In the discussion, we neglect the condition that two parties select the same private key 
accidentally, since the possibility is extremely small. Therefore, when accepting new session 
partners, the time consumption of this decentralised solution is a little less than that of the 
centralised solution discussed in Chapter 3. 
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It is a little complex to assess the time consumption of initiating communication between two 
session partners that have never contact before. Since two session partners that never 
communicate before may have to exchange their identifiers via other session partners, this 
time consumption depends on how many session partners are involved within the process of 
exchanging the identifiers. Figure 34 details a structure of a session, within which a session 
partner Partnerl invokes all the other session partners (Partner2 to Partnern). Thus, 
Partnerl has the trust from all other session partners. Assume two session partners P1 and P" 
where I, J E { 2,3, .. , n} , attempt to generate a secret key and start communication. So, in the 
worst case, the time consumption Tgc(i,J) should be: 
2 6 
Tgc(i, j) ~ L T.ecret(i , j),u + LTmessage(i, j), u 
u=l ll=l 
The time it takes for every partner in this session to form original connections with all the 
other session partners Tgac should be: 
n j-1 
~'L'L 
n j - 1 
Tgac = L L (Tgc{i,J)) 
j=3 i=2 
2 6 
( LTsecret(i , j ), u + L T,,.essage(i, j), u ) 
j=3 i=2 ll=l ll=l 
-- (n -l)(n- 2) (2 -Tsecret 
2 
+6 T message ) 
n j-1 2 11 j-1 6 
L L (LI'.ecret(i,j),ll) L L (L T,nessage(i,j),u) 
j=3 i=2 ll=l j=3 i=2 u=l Where T secret = -'------,.-j---:1 --- and T secret = -'--:....:.....::...._:....:....n--:-j_-:1 ---
LL2 'L'L 6 
j=3 i=2 j=3 i=2 
c:=J 
PartnerS 
Partner! 
Figure 34 Session structure (1) 
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It is notable that the order of growth of above equality is O[n2 ] , the same as that of the 
inequality (5) in Section 4.3. 
Consider a session, which is presented within Figure 35. In this session, each P1 is invoked by 
P1.t. where i E {2,3, .. , n} . So to initiate a communication for two strange session partners P1 
and P1. where 1 $ i $ j $ n, the time consumption T gc(i,J) should be: 
2 2(j-i)+2 
T gc(i, j) $ LTsecret(i, j), tt + L T,nessage(i, j),tt 
u=l tt=l 
For every partner in the session to generate trust relationship with each other, the time 
consumption Tgac should be: 
n j-2 
Tgac = LLTgc(i ,j) 
j=3 i=l 
II j -2 2 2(j-i)+2 
$ L L (L T.ecret(i, j), u + L T,nessage(i, j), 11) 
j=3 i= l u=l u=l 
From the above equality, we can see that in the worst case the order of growth of initiating 
the communication among session partners is O[n3 ] , which is higher than that of the 
centralised solution ( O[n2 ] ). 
Partner! Partner2 
Partner)~ 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 0 Partnern 
Figure 35 Session structure (2) 
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4.4.3 Comparison lbetween the Centralised §oBution and the Decentralised 
Solution 
Both the centralised solution and the decentralised solution have their own advantages. The 
decentralised solution does not rely on any third party to manage the key distribution. 
Therefore, the decentralised solution avoids the inherent drawbacks of protocols that rely on a 
third party. This is a great advantage. Nevertheless, it also has some inevitable drawbacks. 
Here, we list some of them as follows: 
o In the decentralised solution, session partners lack effective ways to get the 
real-time information of the session (e.g., the change in the number of 
session partners, the information of newly accepted session partners). 
o In the decentralised solution, it is difficult to examine whether the identity 
of a session partner is unique in the session. 
o In the decentralised solution, the session partners also have the 
responsibility to help other related session partners to initiate 
communication. Consequently, the Web services involved in the session 
have to keep the session information until the end of the session, even when 
they have finished their job. 
o In the decentralised solution, the security of the session is dependent upon 
the security of every session partner. The strength of a chain is determined 
by the weakest link. Therefore, when a session partner crashes or becomes 
compromised, it maybe be fatal tothe entire session. 
Overall, the decentralised solution traverses the identifiers through session partners and its 
security is generated on the assumption that all the session partners are secure and trustable. 
If a session partner is compromised, the security of all the session may be easily 
compromised in many cases. Compared with the centralised solution, its fatal drawback is its 
inability of providing session partners real-time session information. After evaluating these 
two solutions, we finally select the centralised one. 
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4.6 Sll.llmmall."y 
In this chapter, we introduced the implementation of our experiment. The main part of the 
experiment is concentrated on proving the linear increase of time consumption when 
introducing Web service instances into the session. Since it is very difficult to generate a large 
number of Web services executed on different computers respectively, we develop an 
experiment to simulate the working environment of our protocols. In order to make our 
solution more convincing, we use an analytic model to further prove the experimental results. 
Furthermore, we describe a decentralised solution and compare it with the solution described 
in Chapter 3. In the next chapter, we will discuss the conclusion from the research and 
mention future work. 
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§.1 CondusioJrnS 
Web service is a new technology that emerged several years ago. People believe that this 
technology is able to help corporations generate e-business solutions which are more effective 
and dynamic than ever. Unfortunately, the lack of proper solutions to secure Web services is a 
major obstacle to large-scale commercial usage of the approach. The main goal of this 
research is to explore multi-party authentication issues for Web services and to develop a 
multi-party authentication system for Web services capable of providing reliable session 
security service and management to a Web service business. 
Up until now, the prototype system has been generated and the results obtained from the 
experiment show that the session authentication system could provide trustable session key 
management: 
o A Web service instance within one particular session can select some 
unique identifier among the session partners, and with this identifier, it will 
not be confused with others. 
o The public key algorithm is involved so that the identifiers cannot be forged. 
Supplementary to this, a measure is provided for the session partners to 
validate the identity of the object who it is communicating with. 
o The mistake of sending the messages to the service instance within different 
session is avoided. In the experiment, some errors were deliberately 
inserted into the experiment system, for instance, changing the identifiers 
of the session partners and changing the private keys of the session partners. 
These errors were detected successfully. 
The experiment system employs Session Authority, which is a fixed, highly secure trusted 
third party, to manage all the secure information of the session partners and so it is a 
centralised management mechanism. Therefore, our system inevitably suffers from the single 
point failure and single point attack. 
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On the contrary, the distributed management mechanism requires all the group numbers take 
part in the management to overcome the shortcomings mentioned above. However, the 
distributed management is notoriously complex and computationally heavy [AMIOO]. 
Currently, some algorithms (decentralised group key algorithms) are mentioned for the 
distributed key management in the peer-to-peer groups in some paper [AMIOO, KIMOO (1)], 
and we have introduced them briefly in the previous chapter. Essentially, these algorithms are 
only suitable for relatively small groups [KIMOO (1)]. Furthermore, they only can generate a 
general key for all the group partners. Therefore, they are not suitable to resolve the multi-
party session authentication issue we discussed above. 
The centralised management mechanism has its irreplaceable advantages, simplicity and 
effectiveness. Nowadays, nearly all the most popular security systems (e.g., Kerberos, PKl 
[GER98, HOU02], Kryptoknight, etc.) make use of some kind of trusted third party to 
manage the secure information. Thus after analysing the models of the centralised solution 
and the distributed solution separately, the centralised system proves to be the choice that is 
more sensible. 
5.2 Future Work 
The session management of Web services is still a new field in the area of Web service 
security. The system developed has great potential to be improved, and it will act as the 
foundation for the future search. 
5.2.1 Searching for Potential Candidates of the Public-Key Algorithm 
In the experiment, the Diffie-Hellman algorithm is used to generate the secret key among the 
session partners. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is a very famous key agreement algorithm and 
is wildly employed by existing security systems. However, it still makes sense to attempt to 
employ other key agreement algorithms to our security system and compare their 
performances, so that the optimum one may be selected. 
Up until the present, the performance of the ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) algorithm 
[STI02] is checked in the experiment and its performance has been compared with the Diffie-
Hellman algorithm (see Figure 36). 
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Performance of two algorithms with the same security strength 
'iii 100000 -t--------"'--'-------,--~H , 
1: 
0 80000 +-----------~F-----1 J 60000 +-------..,...-::~'---------~ g 
Ql 40000 -t----:::-.:z: ... ""---------- ---1 
E i= 20000 +--IF----------------1 
Instance within the session 
-+- DH (512-bit private key ,512-
bit key space) 
- ECC (112-bit private key, 
112-bit key space) 
Figure 36 Comparison between the Diffie-Hellman algorithm and the ECC algorithm 
In the experiment, the ECC algorithm does not show any speed advantage in the competition 
with the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Diffie-Hellman 
algorithm is better than the ECC algorithm. In practice, several optimisations for the ECC 
algorithm can be employed to reduce the computational consumption. In the future, the 
optimised measures for the ECC algorithm will be implemented and other asymmetric 
security algorithms will continue to be explored in order to improve the performance of the 
system. 
5.2.2 Semantic Issues of Session Management 
In the session management system, theCA action model is leveraged to manage Web service 
sessions. CA actions have a good mechanism to handle the exceptions that occur in a 
distributed system. However, before it is integrated into a Web service environment, many 
semantic issues must be explored. For instance, the system comprised of Web services is loss-
coupled. Different Web services may be developed and maintained by different organizations. 
It is normal that they select different ways to express exceptions and handle them. Therefore, 
it is necessary to find an efficient way to help the CAA manager understand the meanings of 
the exceptions thrown by different roles so that it can effectively organize the roles to handle 
these exceptions. 
Beside the work cited above, there are still many things left to do. For instance, new security 
protocols for Web service are continually emerging. Some of these protocols can be 
integrated into our solutions. When the authentication system was designed, there was no 
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security protocol for Web service specifying how to generate the secure conversation between 
two Web service instances. Therefore, we define the conversation messages in our solution by 
ourselves. Moreover, in our design, the MAC (message authentication code) tehcnique is 
necessary to prove the origin of the message and it should be attached to the SOAP message 
with WS-Security protocol. Until the experiment is finished, Sun Corporation has not 
provided the APis for this protocol. So the present experiment is aimed at evaluating the 
scalability of the instance ID Authenticator protocol, and the secret keys were transported in 
plain text. In the future, theWS-Security and other new emerged security protocols (e.g., WS-
SecureConversation) will be integrated into the experiment system, and performance of the 
system will be further evaluated. 
In brief, there is great potential for future work on our solution. In our opinion, at moment the 
most pressing need is for an effective and optimized mechanism to distribute and manage the 
identifiers for session partners. 
In the field of web service session management, there is still much to explore. 
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